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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 As far back as 1944, delegates from forty-five countries gathered at Bretton 
woods to consider the economic causes of the world war that was then still raging; 
and how to secure the peace. They therefore agreed to create the international 
Bank for Reconstruction and development, on the ground that programs of 
reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere as well 
as aiding political stability and fostering peace. 
 
Unfortunately, over the past five decades, the recurrent cycles of weak governance, 
poverty and violence have played many laws. In fact, not one low-income country 
coping with these problems has yet achieved a single millennium development goal. 
Again, the problems of fragile state spread easily. That is, they drag down 
neighbors with violence. Here, economic political and security factors can all 
exacerbate the risks of violence. Some of these factors are domestic such as low 
incomes, high unemployment and inequality of different sorts. Yet, some factors 
may originate outside the state, such as external economic shocks or the infiltration 
of international drug cartels or foreign fighters. Clearly, table 1.1  
 
TABLE 1.1 STRESSES: ECONOMIC / POLITICAL/ SECURITY 
STRESSES INTERNAL EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIC LOW INCOME LEVELS, LOW 
OPPORTUNITY COST OF 
REBELION YOUTH 
UNEMPLOYMENT NATURAL 
RESOURCE WEALTH SEVERE 
CORRPTION RAPID 
URBANIZATION 
PRICE SHOCKS CLIMATE CHANGE 
POLITICAL ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS OR 
REGIONAL COMPETITION REAL 
OR PERCIEVED DISCRIMINATION 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
PERCIEVED GLOBAL INEQIUTY 
AND INJUSTICE IN THE 
TREATMENT OF ETHNIC OR 
RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
SECURITY LEGACIES OF VIOLENCE AND 
TRAUMA 
INVASION, OCCUPATION 
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR 
DOMESTIC REBELS CROSS-
BORDER CONFLICT SPILLOVERS 
TRANSITIONAL TERRORISM 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
NETWORKS 
 
Refers to these triggers of violence as security economic and justice stresses (World 
Bank, 2011); Here, internal security stresses can arise when particular elites or 
groups feel threatened (often as a result of past oppression) and organize to defend 
themselves. Again, external threats to security can heighten internal pressures and 
many states face pressure or incursions from outside state and non-state actors. In 
fact, outside resources and armed intervention may tip the scales in favor of on 
actor, allowing it to renege on agreements with other actors. This can come in the 
form attacks from safe havens in neighboring countries or from the activities of drug 
traffickers or transitional terrorist. Regrettably, some African countries have had the 
misfortune of experiencing all these forms of external security stress as well as 
internal stresses. In other words, areas with cross-border ethnic links and low 
civilian government presence have long been subject to insecurity and remain at 
present. 
 Furthermore, external security threats can develop out of violence in 
neighboring countries. That is the neighborhood effect can both increase the risk of 
civil war in countries with neighbors at war and have detrimental development 
effects over borders. Thus, the movement of persons trained in violence; the 
displacement of person who may cross borders and become refugees; the 
disruption of trade; the expansion of animal networks through globalization 
(trafficking); and the safe haven that rebels often seek by crossing borders suggest 
that violence cannot be easily contained (given weak suggestions). In other words, 
all societies’ face stresses, but only some succumb to repeated violence. In fact, 
unemployment, income shocks, rising inequalities between social groups, external 
security threats and international organized crime have plausible casual 
relationships with violence. Thus, stresses related to security economics and politics 
can increase the risk of violence; and they tend to combine and precipitate actual 
violence. However, societies that rely on elite pacts, coercion and patronage to 
control violence risk repeating a vicious cycle. In fact, where agreements among 
elites to end fighting do not result in a transformation in state-society institutions 
and better governance outcomes; they remain vulnerable to the same stresses that 
precipitated fighting. In these circumstance, any stresses that shift the balance of 
power (such as the death of a leader, external security threats or economic and 
demographic pressures) risk further violence. Yet, at some point, this violence will 
be ended through other elite pacts; but without broader and deeper institutional 
transformation, the cycle will repeat as shown in figure 1.1 
 
FIGURE1.1 VICIOUS CYCLE TRAP: REPEATED VULNERABLITY 
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Indeed, this vicious cycle can become more difficult to escape overtime, as each 
successive round of violence to escape further weakens institutions and destroys 
social capital. Historically, the large scale episodes of violence have been a feature 
of all human societies. Regrettably, this cycle is doomed to repeat until societies. 
Find collective institutions to meditate and control violence. Thus, the challenge for 
these societies remains that of escaping vicious cycle of repeated violence 
(especially in Africa) yet, international actors know that fast engagement, long-term 
commitments and support to national institutions are central to preventing repeated 
cycles of violence. Unfortunately, these actors are slow to change because of dual 
accountability dilemma as shown in figure 1.2 
 
FIGURE 1.2 DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY DILEMMAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, these actors (bilateral or multilateral) are accountable (first) to their 
domestic constituencies and share holders; and only (second) to their counterparts 
or to the citizens of recipient states. In fact, this had led to emphasize one set of 
risks (the risks of action and of engagement with weak counterpart institutions) at 
the expense of the risks of in action or lack of long-term institution building 
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outcomes for which there is less accountability (world bank, 2011). Here, the 
consequences are twofold: privileging the reputational risks of action over the 
consequential risks of delay and hesitations channel financing and assistance 
through the budget of fragile national institutions. 
 In fact, working in fragile states necessarily involves uncertainty, fluidity, and 
high risk. Yet, there are risks of action and risks of in action. Here, there is no 
certainty that development interventions will save lives and prevent the spread of 
violence but hasty interventions often are less likely to succeed. However, donors 
confront a dilemma, that is, assistance to weak institutions is needed if they are 
ever to become strong; but their weakness in itself poses political (fiduciary) risks. 
Regrettably, in these high risk engagements, the international community is 
therefore prone to rely on bilateral (multilateral) organizations to perform functions 
normally performed by the state (in order to avoid being associated with the corrupt 
use of resources or the violence or human rights abuses by the parties being 
supported.) 
 Indeed, corruption is not just a local challenge; international male factors are 
significant in corruption dynamics and can pose a substantial obstacle to national 
efforts at transformation. Notably, corruption produces human rights violation and 
affects many lives. When individuals and families have to pay bribes to access food, 
housing, property, education, jobs and the right to participate in the cultural life of 
community basic human rights is clearly violated. Therefore, in tackling these ills, 
there can be no doubt of the forging closer ties between those working for human  
rights and those fighting against corruption (transparency international, 2004). But 
it is also clear that to work most effectively together, the question (just what have 
human rights to do with corruption) is one that needs further reflection. Obviously 
corruption hits hardest at the poorest in society. That is, those with limited or no 
possibilities to defend themselves. But corruption affects the whole of society as 
well. In other words, decisions supposed by taken for the public good are in truth 
motivated by a desire for private gain and result in policies and projects that 
impoverish rather than enrich a country. 
 Yet, in order for a corrupt system to prevail; numerous other rights are likely 
to be restricted in the areas of political participation and access to justice. Here, the 
need for the corrupt to protect themselves and their cronies undermines the 
electoral process, leads to intimidation and manipulation of the press and 
compromises the independence of the Judiciary. However, if human rights are 
violated by corruption, respect for human rights can be a powerful tool in fighting 
corruption as well as insecurity in Africa. Therefore, this paper is driven by the 
conviction that in order to build a world in which security is underpinned by 
sustainable development and social justice; and where globalization works to the 
benefit of all the world’s people, multilateralism and respect for international law 
(such as international human rights law) are vital in Africa. The rest of this paper is 
divided into eight sections. Section two presents Global terrorism status while Global 
corruption status is the theme of Section three. Section four examines the African 
Regional Conflict While Nigerian Disintegration movement is the sub topic of section 
five. Revolutionary security implications are the subject matter of section six. 
Section seven presents institutional reform strategies while resilience policy 
measures are discussed in section eight. Section nine concludes the paper.  
 
2.0 GLOBAL TERRORISM STATUS 
Regrettably, traditional values for hard work, morals and integrity have been 
abandoned for pursuit of wealth by any means leading to constant conflict, 
aggression, violence, attack and counter attack among others. Therefore, 
investigations have revealed that the major factors responsible for these anti-social 
behaviors are the brutal experiences brought by civil wars, protracted era of military 
dictatorship and bad governance. Consequently, these precipitating factors breeds 
impurity and unethical culture of drug abuse, cyber crime, sexual harassment, 
corruption, violent crimes, ideological crimes etc investigations have also revealed 
that these crisis are general phenomena that cut across nations, societies, disciples, 
gender and other dispositions of life. Clearly, the perpetrators may be found among 
every class and nationality while none can be exonerated by the attacks. 
Indeed, the problems of threat (violent terror) is universal (dynamic) and 
antecedents have shown that terrorist utilities wide varieties of methods and styles 
to achieve their goals such as bombing, kidnapping, hostage, armed attack, 
assassination, etc. Basically, threat is the major weapon used by terrorist to 
intimidate their targets and the various types of threat include physical, verbal, 
insider as well as outsider. 
 
 In general, terrorism refers to the use of violent action in order to achieve 
political aims or to force a government to act. On the other hand, terrorist can be 
defined as anyone involved or causes attack upon a person’s life which may cause 
serious bodily harm or death; kidnapping of a person; destruction to government or 
public facility; transport system, infrastructural facility including information system; 
a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, public place or private property 
likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss. It also include the 
seizure of an air craft, ship or other means of public or goods transport as well as 
the use of such means of terrorist actions have started in the ancient times through 
merciless killings, intimidations, rituals, and other barbaric forms; they were not 
specifically referred to as terrorism until much later. Thus, international terrorism 
has become a global problem which presents a threat to the world stability and the 
consequences may determine world community future. Clearly, terrorism maybe in 
various forms depending on the motives and motivation of the actors. These forms 
include domestic terrorism, International terrorism and Quasi-terrorism. In all 
ramifications, terrorism is designed to threaten the personal safety of the targeted 
audience as well as the creation of insecurity. Thus, the general effect of these 
actions may be classified into economical, political, social and physiological 
categories. 
 As at today, the known foreign terrorist organizations A (F.T.O) are shown in 
table 2.1 (United States, 2012). Constitutionally, an F.T.O must be foreign 
organization. It must engage in terrorist activity or terrorism or retain the capability 
and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. Again, the organization 
terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of the United States 
nationals or the national security (National Defense, foreign relations or economic 
interests) of the United States (and allies). Indeed, non proliferation efforts have 
been a top United States national security priority for decades. That is, reducing the  
amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (C.B.R.N) material produced 
and stored.  
 
TABLE 2.1 FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (F.T.O): 
CLASSIFICATION STATUS 
 
 A B C D E F G 
S/
N 
FTO ALTERNATE 
IDENTITY 
DATING 
IDENTIFICA
TION 
ACTIVITIES STRENGHT LOCATIONAL 
OPEATION 
FUNDING AID 
1 ABDALLAH 
AZZAM 
BRIGADES 
(AAB) 
ZIYARD AL-
JAMAH 
BATTALIONS 
MAY 30 2012 ROCKET 
ATTACKS 
BOMING 
ATTACKS 
UNKNOWN LEBANON 
ARABIAN 
PENNISULA 
UNKNOWN 
 
2 ABU NIDAL 
ORGANIZATI
ON (ANO) 
ARAB 
REVOLUTIONARY 
COUNCIL 
OCTOBER O8 
1997 
PLANE 
HIJACKING 
ASSASINATIO
NS 
UNKNOWN LEBANON LIBYA/SYRIA/IRA
N DECLINED 
SUPPORT 
  
 
 
3 ABU SAYYAF 
GROUP (ASG) 
ISLAMIC 
MOVEMENT 
OCTOBER 08 
1997 
KIDNAPPINGS 
BEHEADINGS 
EXTORTION 
ABOUT 400 
MEMBERS 
SULU 
ARCHIPELAGO 
ZAMBOANGA 
PENINSULA 
KIDNAPPING 
FUND JEMAAH 
ISLAMIYA 
4 AL-AQSA 
MARTYRS 
BRIGADE 
(AAMB) 
AL-AQSA 
MARTYRS 
BATTALION 
MARCH 27 
2002 
ARMS ATTACK 
SUISIDE 
BOMBINGS 
ROCKET 
MISSLES 
ABOUT 400 
MEMBERS 
GAZA LEBANON 
REFUGEE CAMPS 
IRAN HIZBALLAH 
FACILITATORS 
5 ANSAR AL-
ISLAM (AAI) 
SOLDIERS OF 
ISLAM 
MARCH 22 
2004 
KIDNAPINGS 
EXECUTIONS 
ASSASINATIO
NS 
LARGEST 
SUNNI 
TERRORIST 
GROUPS 
NORTHERN IRAQ 
WESERN AND 
CENTRAL IRAQ 
EUROPEAN/MID
DLE EAST 
NETWORK OF 
CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES 
 A B C D E F G 
S/
N 
FTO 
ALTERNATE 
IDENTITY 
DATING 
IDENTIFICATIO
N 
ACTIVITIES 
STRENGH
T 
LOCATION
AL 
OPEATION 
FUNDING AID 
6 
ARMY OF 
ISLAM (AOI) 
JAISH AL-
ISLAM 
MAY 19 2011 
KIDNAPPINGS 
ARMED ATTACK 
ABOUT 100 
MEMBERS 
GAZA 
EGYPT/ISRE
AL ATTACKS 
GAZA-BASED 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
7 
ASBAT AL-
ANSAR (AAA) 
GATHERING 
OF 
SUPPORTERS 
MARCH 27 2002 
ASSASINATION 
BOMBING 
ABOUT 
2,000 
MEMBERS 
LEBANON-
PALESTINIA
N REFUGEE 
CAMP 
INTERNATIONAL 
SUNN/EXTERMIST 
NETWORKS 
8 
AUM 
SHINRIKYO 
(AUM) 
AUM 
SUPREME 
TRUTH 
OCTOBER 08 1997 
CHEMICAL WARFARE 
SARIN GAS ATTACK 
BOMB THREAT 
ABOUT 
40,000 
MEMBERS 
JAPAN  
RUSSIA 
MEMBERSHIP 
CONTRIBUTION 
9 
BAQUE 
FATHERLAND 
AND LIBERTY 
(ETA) 
EUSKAI 
HERRITARRO
K 
OCTOBER 08 1997 
DEADLY BOMBING 
ARM ATTACKS 
ASSASINATION 
ABOUT 750 
MEMBERS 
NORTHERN 
SPAIN 
SOUTHWEST
ERN FRANCE 
CUBA/VENES
ULA 
EXTORTION INCOME 
REVOLUTIONARY 
TAXES 
DISCONTINUATION 
10 
COMMUNIST 
OF 
PHILLIPINES 
EW PEOPLE’S 
ARMY 
(CCP/NPA) 
NEW 
PEOPLE’S 
ARMY 
AUGUST 09 2002 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 
EXTORTION ACTS 
ARMS RALDING 
ABOUT 
4,000 
MEMBERS 
RURAL 
LUZON 
VISAYAS 
MINDANAO 
EXTORTION FUNDS 
11 
CONTINUITY 
IRISH 
REPUBLICAN 
ARMY (CIRA) 
CONTINUITY 
ARMY 
COUNCIL 
JULY 13 2004 
HIJACKINGS 
ROBBERIES 
ASSASINATIONS 
ABOUT 50 
MEMBERS 
NORTHERN 
ISLAND 
IRISH 
REPUBLIC 
CRIMINAL ATIVITIES 
SMUGGLING BASED 
FUNDING 
12 
GAMA’S AL-
ISLAMIYYA 
ISLAMIC 
GROUP 
OCTOBER 08 1997 
ARMED ATTACKS 
ASSASINATION 
ABOUT 
1000 
MEMBERS 
AFGHANIST
AN YEMEN 
IRAN 
UNKNOWN 
13 HAMAS 
ISLAMIC 
RESISTANCE 
MOVEMENT 
OCTOBER 08 1997 
ROCKET LAUNCHES 
SUICIDE BOMBINGS 
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES 
ABOUT 
9,000 
MEMBERS 
WEST BANK 
GAZA 
LEBENON 
IRAN PERSIAN GULF 
PALESTIAN 
EXPATRIATES 
14 
HAQQANI 
NETWORK 
(HQN) 
HQN 
SEPTEMBER 19, 
2012 
SUICIDE BOMB 
KIDNAPPING 
ABOUT 100 
MEMBERS 
AFGHANIST
AN 
PAKISTAN 
BORDER 
PAKISTAN GULF 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
15 
HARAKAT 
LILJIHAD-I-
ISLAMI (HUJI) 
MOVEMENT 
OF ISLAMIC 
HOLY WAR 
AUGUST 06 2010 
SUICIDE BOMBING 
ARMS ATTACK 
ABOUT 700 
MEMBERS 
SOUTH ASIA 
INDIA 
AFGHANIST
AN 
UNKNOWN 
16 HARAKAT LIL- HARAKATULJI MARCH 05 2010 GRENADE ATTACK ABOUT 400 BANGLADES INTERNATIONAL 
  
JIHADI 
ISLAM/BANGL
ADESH (HUJI-
B) 
HAD AL 
ISLAMI 
MEMBERS H INDIA MUSLIM NGDS 
17 
HARAKAT UL-
MUJAHIDEEN 
(HUM) 
JAMAIT LIL-
ANSAR 
OCTOBER 06 1997 
HIJACKING CIVILIAN 
ASSAULT 
SEVERAL 
HUNDREDS 
SUPPORTE
RS 
AFGHANIST
AN 
PAKISTAN 
PAKISTAN 
WEALTHY/GRASSROO
T DONORS 
18 HIZBALLAH 
ISLAMIC 
JIHAD 
ORGANIZATIO
N 
OCTOBER 08 1997 
SUICIDE BOMBING 
KIDNAPPING 
ASSASINATION 
SEVRAL 
THOSANDS 
SUPPORTE
RS 
BEIRUT 
SOUTHERN 
LEBENON 
IRAN SYRIA ILLEGAL 
BUSINESSES 
19 
INDIAN 
MUJAHEDEEN 
(M) 
ISLAMIC 
SECURITY 
FORCE (ISF) 
SEPTEMBER 19 
2011 
BOMBING ATTACKS 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
SUPPORTE
RS 
INDIA 
FTO 
PAKISTAN MIDDLE 
EAST 
 A B C D E F G 
20 ISLAMIC 
JIHAD 
UNION 
(IJU) 
LIBYAN 
SOCIETY 
JUNE 17 2005 ARMS ATTACK 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
ABOUT 200 
MEMBERS 
PAKISTAN 
EUROPE 
AFGHANISTAN 
UNKNOWN 
21 ISLAMIC 
MOVEMEN
T OF 
LIZBEKIST
AN (IMU) 
IMU SEPTEMBER 25 
2000 
SUICIDE ATTACK ABOUT 300 
MEMBERS 
SPOTH ASIA 
CENTRAL ASIA 
IRAN 
UZBEK DIASPORA 
TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION 
EUROPEAN 
DONORS 
22 JAISH-E-
MOHAMME
D (JEM) 
MOHAMME
D’S ARMY 
DECEMBER 26 
2001 
SUICIDE CAR 
BOMBING 
SEVERAL 
HUNDRED 
ARMED 
SUPPOETER
S 
KASH MIR-INDIA 
AFGHANISTAN 
BUSINESS 
INVESTMENTS 
23 JEMMAH 
ANAHARUT 
TAUHID 
(JAT) 
LASKAR MARCH 13 
2012 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
DETONATED 
EXPLOSIVES 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
SUPPORTER
S 
INDONESIA 
MALAYSIA 
PHILLIPINES 
MEMBERSHIP 
DONATIONS BANK 
ROBBERIES CYBER 
HACKING 
  
24 JEMMAH 
ISLAMIYA 
(JI) 
JEMAA OCTOBER 23 
2002 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
MEMBERS 
MALAYSIA 
PHILIPINES 
MEMBERSHIP 
DONATION 
CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES 
25 JUNDALLA
H 
PEOPLE’S 
RESISTANC
E 
MOVEMEN
T OF IRAN 
(PMRI) 
NOVEMBER 04 
2010 
SUICIDE BOMB 
ATTACK 
ABOUT 2000 
MEMBERS 
AFGHANISTAN 
PAKISTAN IRAN 
UNKNOWN 
26 KAHANE 
CHAI 
JUDEA 
POLICE 
OCTOBER 08 
1997 
SUICIDE BOMB 
ATTACK 
ABOUT 100 
MEMBERS 
ISREAL WEST 
BANK HERBON 
UNITED 
STATES/EUROPEAN 
SYMPATHIZERS 
27 KATA’IB 
HIZBALLAH 
(KH) 
ISLAMIC 
RESISTANC
E IN IRAQ 
JULY 02 2009 ROCKET 
PROPELLED 
GRENADE 
ATTACKS 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES 
ABOUT 400 
INDIVIDUAL
S 
IRAQ SYRIA IRAN SUPPORTERS 
LEBENESE-
HIZBALLAH 
28 KURDISTA
N 
WORKERS’ 
PARTY 
(PKK) 
PEOPLES 
DEFENCE 
FORCE 
OCTOBER 08 
1997 
BOMBING 
ATTACK 
ABOUT 5000 
MEMBERS 
TURKEY IRAQ 
EUROPE 
EUROPEAN 
KURDISH 
DIASPORA 
CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES 
29 LASHKAR 
E-TAYYIBA 
(LT) 
ARMY OF 
THE PURE 
AND 
RIGHTEOU
S 
DECEMBER 26 
2001 
ASSAULT RIFLES 
MORTARS 
ROCKET-
PROPELLED 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
MEMBERS 
SOUTH ASIA 
PAKISTAN 
PAKISTAN/GULF/E
UROPEAN 
DONATIONS 
 A B C D E F G 
30 LASHKAR I. 
JHANGVI (LJ) 
ARMY OF 
JHANGVI 
JANUARY 
30 2003 
ARMED 
ATTACKS 
BOMBINGS 
ABOUT 100 
MEMBERS 
PUNJAB KARACHI 
BALUCHISTAN 
PAKISTAN/SAUDI/ARA
BIA DONATIONS 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES 
31 LIBERATION 
TIGERS OF 
TAMIL ECLEM 
(LTTE) 
TAMIL 
TIGERS 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
SUICIDE 
BOMBERS 
SEATIGERS AIR 
TIGERS 
UNKNOWN SRI LANKA INDIA TAMILDIASPORA 
CHARITIES 
32 LIBYAN LIFG DECEMBE UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 
ISLAMIC 
FIGHTING 
GROUP (LIFG) 
R 17 2004 
33 MOROCCAN 
ISLAMIC 
COMBATANT 
GROUP (GICM) 
GICM OCTOBER 
11 2005 
SUICIDE 
ATTACK 
MADRID 
BOMBINGS 
UNKNOWN MORROCO 
WESTERN 
EUROPE 
AFGHANISTAN 
NARCOTICS 
TRAFFICKING 
34 NATIONAL 
LIBERATION 
ARMY (ELN) 
EJERCITO 
DE 
LIBERACION 
NATIONAL 
OCTBER 
08 1997 
HIJACKINGS 
KIDNAPPINGS 
EXTORTION 
ACTIVITIES 
ABOUT 2000 
MEMBERS 
COLOMBIA 
VENEZUELA 
NARCOTICS TRADE 
OIL/GAS COMPANIES 
EXTORTIONS 
35 PALESTINE 
ISLAMIC 
JIHAD-
SHAQAQL 
FACTION (PLF) 
ISLAMIC 
JIHAD IN 
PALSTINE 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
ROCKET 
ATTACKS 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES 
DETONATED 
BOMB 
ABOUT 1000 
MEMBERS 
GAZA/WEST BANK 
ISREAL/SYRIA 
LEBENON/MIDDLE 
EAST 
IRAN 
36 PALESAINE 
LIBERATION 
FRONT-ABU 
ABBA-S 
FACTION (PLF) 
ABU ABBAS OCTOBER 
08 1997 
ARMS ATTACK ABOUT 500 
MEMBERS 
DAMASCUS 
LEBANON GAZA 
SYRIA IRAN 
37 POPULAR 
FRONT FOR 
THE 
LIBERATION 
OF PALESTINE 
(PFLP) 
PALESTINE 
POPULAR 
RESISTANCE 
FORCES 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
SUICIDE 
BOMBINGS 
ROCKET 
ATTACKS 
MORTAR 
UNKNOWN SYRIA/LEBANON 
ISREAL/WEST 
BANK, GAZA 
SYRIA SAFE HAVEN 
38 POPULAR 
FRONT FOR 
THE 
LIBERATIO OF 
PALESTINE 
GENERAL 
COMMAND 
(PFLP-GC) 
PFLP-GC OCTOBER 
08 1997 
HOT-AIR 
BALLONS 
MOTORIZED 
JANG GAIDERS 
ROCKET 
ATTACK 
SEVERAL 
HUNDRED 
DAMASCUS 
LEBANON GAZA 
SYRIA SAFE HAVEN 
IRAN FINANCE 
39 AL-QA’IDA 
(AQ) 
USAMA BIN-
LADEN 
ORGANIZATI
ON BASE 
FOR JIHAD 
OCTOBER 
09 1999 
PLANE HYJACK 
FIRED MISSLES 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
TOO 
NUMEROUS 
UNKNOWN 
AFGHANISTAN 
SYRIA/IRAQ 
YEMEN/SOMAUA 
HUMANITARIAN 
DONATIONS 
CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS 
  A B C D E F G 
40 AL-QAIDA IN 
THE AABIAN 
PENINSULA 
(AQAP) 
ANSAR AL-
SHARIF 
JANUARY 
19 2010 
EXPLOSIVE-
LADEN 
PACKAGES 
ASSASINATION 
ABOUT 1000 
MEMBERS 
YEMEN ROBBERIES 
KIDNAP 
DONATIONS 
41 AL-QAIDA IN 
IRAQ (AQ) 
AL-QAIDA 
GROUP OF 
JIHAD 
DECEMBE
R 17 2004 
IMPOVERISHED 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES/ROCKE
T 
ATTACKS/BOMBI
NG 
ABOUT 2000 
MEBERS 
IRAQ SYRIA 
NORTH 
AFRICA 
CRIMINAL 
BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES 
42 AL-QAIDA IN 
THE ISLAMIC 
MAGHREB 
(AQIM) 
GROUP FOR 
CALL AND 
COMBAT 
MARCH 27 
2002 
IMPOVERISHED 
EXPLOSIVES 
DEVICES 
BOMBING/KIDNA
PPING 
ABOUT 1000 
MEMBERS 
ALGERIA 
MALI/NIGER 
MAURITANIA 
CRIMINAL 
ACTIVITIES 
AFRICAN/EUROP
EAN DIASPORA 
43 REAL IRA (RIRA) REAL IRISH 
REPUBLICAN 
ARMY 
MAY 16 
2001 
BOMBING 
SHOOTING 
ASSAULTS 
ABOUT 100 
MEMBERS 
NORTHERN 
ISLAND GREAT 
BRITAIN IRISH 
REPUBLIC 
UNITED STATES 
SYMPATHIZERS 
BALIKANS/IRISH 
44 REVOLUTIONAR
Y ARMED 
FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA 
(FARC) 
FUERZAS 
ARMEDAS 
REVOLCLONAR
IAS DE 
COLOMBIA 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
MORTAR 
ATTACKS SNIPER 
ATTACKS 
HIJACKING 
ABOUT 9000 
MEMBERS 
COLOMBIA CUBA ECUADOR 
VENEZUELA 
45 REVOLUTIONAR
Y 
ORGANIZATION 
17 NOVEMBER 
(17N) 
EPAN ASTNKI 
ORGANOSI 17 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
BOMBING 
ASSASINATION 
UNKNOWN ATHENS 
GREECE 
UNKNOWN 
46 REVOLUTIONAR
Y PEOPLES 
LIBERATION 
PARTY FRONT 
(DHKP/C) 
DEV SOL 
ARMED 
REVOLUTIONA
RY 
OCTOBER 
08 1997 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
ASSASINATIONS 
IMPOVERISHED 
EXPLOSIVES 
SEVERAL DOZEN 
MEMBERS 
TURKEY 
ANKARA 
INSTABUL 
DONATIONS 
EXTORTIONS 
EUROPEAN 
FUNDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by states; restricting the diversion of materials and expertise for illicit use; and 
preventing the trafficking of CBRN weapons and related material. Yet, CBRN 
materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat as evidenced by; 
terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and used these materials; the nature of injury and 
damage these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics 
now flows; as well as dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and material. 
While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely successful, 
the illicit trafficking of these materials persists (including instances involving highly 
47 RVOLUTIONARY 
STRUGGLE(RS) 
EPANASTATIK
OS AGHONAS 
MAY 18 
2009 
IMPOVERISHED 
EXPLOSSIVE 
DEVICE ROCKET 
PROPELLED 
GRENADE BOMB 
ATTACK 
UNKNOWN ATHENS 
GREECE 
UNKNOWN 
48 AL-SHABAAB 
(AS) 
MOJAHIDIN 
YOUTH 
MOVEMENT 
MARCH 18 
2008 
IMPOVERISHED 
EXPLOSIVE 
DEVICES 
ASSASINATION 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
MEMBERS 
JUBBA 
REGIONS 
BAY/BAKOL 
REGIONS 
SOMALIA 
GLOBAL SOMALI 
DIASPORA 
49 SHINNING PATH 
(SL) 
PEOPLE 
GUERRILA 
ARMY 
OCTOBER 
06 1997 
KIDNAPPING SEVERAL 
HUNDRED 
MEMBERS 
PERU NARCOTICS 
TRADE 
 A B C D E F G 
50 TEHRIK-E 
TALIBAN 
PAKSTAN 
PAKISTAN 
TALIBAN 
SEPTEMBER 
01 2010 
SUICIDE 
BOMBING 
ASSASINATION 
EXPLOSSIVE 
DEVICE 
SEVERAL 
THOUSAND 
MEMBERS 
PAKISTAN ILLEGAL BUSINESSES 
KIDNAPPING 
51 UNITED 
SELF-
DEFENCE 
FORCES OF 
COLOMBIA 
(AUC) 
AUTODEFEN
SAS UNIDAS 
DE 
COLOMBIA 
SEPTEMBER 
10 2001 
POLITICAL 
KILLINHS 
KIDNAPPINGS 
UNKNOWN NORTHWES
T COLOMBIA 
NONE 
enriched uranium (I 2010/11). Therefore, these facts suggest that caches of 
dangerous material may exist on the black market and hat we must complement the 
efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to 
detect, investigate and secure CBRN materials that have been fallen outside of 
regulatory control. 
 
 Globally, over 10,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2011 affecting nearly 
45,000 victims in 70 countries and resulting in over 12,500 deaths (United Sates, 
2011). However, the total number of worldwide attacks dropped by almost 12 
percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007. Although the 2011 numbers 
represent five-year lows, they also underscore the human toil and geographic reach 
of terrorism specifically, Africa experienced 978 attacks in 2011) which was 
equivalent to an 11.5 increase over 2010). This is attributable in large part to the 
more aggressive attack tempo of the Nigeria-based terrorist group Boko Haram. 
Regrettably, this group carried out 136 attacks and killed 590 people in 2011. Yet, in 
contrast to 2011 reports, Taliban killed 1,842 people in 525 attacks and cane top on 
the infamous ranking while Boko Haram took second killing 1,132 in 364 attacks. 
This terrorism report also revealed that of the top 10 countries with the most 
terrorist attacks in 2012, Nigeria came fifth because of the activities of Boko Haram. 
She ranked fourth in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks. In fact, there a 
total number of 546 terror attacks in Nigeria with 1,386 killed in 2012 alone. Thus, 
the average lethality of terrorist attacks in Nigeria is more that 50 percent higher 
than the global average of 1.64 notably; Abubakar Shekau (Nigerian) is the leader 
of Boko Haram  
 
(Which means western education is forbidden). It is a Nigeria-based terrorist 
organization that seeks to overthrow the Nigerian democratic government and 
replace it with a regime based on Islamic law. Indeed, there are reported 
communications, training and weapon links between Boko Haram, Al-Qaida in the 
lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-shabaab, and Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula, which may strengthen Boko Haram’s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks. 
Operationally, the group set off its first vehicle borne impoverished explosive device 
(IED) in June 2011; and has increasingly utilized IEDs in attacks against soft 
targets. However, the Boko Haram’s (August 26, 2011) vehicle-bomb attack on the 
United Nations headquarters (Abuja, Nigeria) marked the group’s first lethal 
operation against western interests. Here, at least 23 people were killed and 80 
people were injured. Notably, a purported Boko Haram spokesman claimed 
responsibility for the attack and promised future targeting of United States and 
Nigerian government interests designated as one of the state sponsor of terrorism, 
Syria continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the 
stability of the region and beyond (even amid significant internal unrest). Obviously, 
Syria provided political and weapons support to Lebanese Hezbollah and continued 
to allow Iran to re-arm the terrorist organization. In fact, the Syrian regime’s 
relationship with Hezbollah and Iran appears to have gotten stronger over the 
course of the conflict in Syria. Regrettably, statements supporting terrorist groups 
(particularly Hezbollah) were often in Syrian government speeches as well as press 
statements. Yet, other state sponsors of terrorism include Cuba, Iran and Sudan 
(United States, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 GLOBAL CORRUPTION STATUS 
 
 Indeed, corruption produces human rights violations and affects many lives. 
When individuals and families have to pay bribes to access food, housing, property, 
education, jobs and the right to participate in the cultural life of the community; 
basic human rights are clearly violated. In order for a corrupt system to prevail, 
numerous other rights are likely to be restricted in the area of political participation 
and access to justice. Therefore, political corruption is the abuse of entrusted power 
by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing power of wealth. 
Regrettably, political corruption involves a wide range of crimes and illicit acts 
committed by political leaders before, during and after leaving office. In contrast to 
petty or bureaucratic corruption, political corruption is perpetrated by political 
leaders or elected officials who have been vested with public authority and who 
bear the responsibility of representing the public interest in fact the loss of faith in 
politics and lack of trust in Politicians as well as parties challenge democratic values; 
a trend that has deepened with the exposure of corruption in the past decades. In 
other words, political corruption threatens the very viability of democracy as it 
makes the newer institutions of democracy vulnerable. Clearly, corruption in political 
finance takes many forms; from the use of donations for personal enrichment to the 
abuse of state resources. 
 That corruption adversely affects economic development has become a 
common place assertion in general discussions. However, ascertaining the precise 
reasons for this is not easy. Obviously, investments are often sunk and cannot be 
redeployed if investors are disillusioned about the institutional environment of a 
country. Here, railroads cannot be moved, pipelines cannot be relocated and real 
estate cannot possibly be used in a different region. That is, politicians and 
bureaucrats may misuse their position once investments are sunk. In fact, they can 
delay necessary permits and hold up investors until offered a bribe. Again, 
governments with a reputation for corruption find it difficult to commit to effective 
policies and to convince investors of their achievements. As a result of such failures, 
capital inflows determine with levels of corruption. Traditionally, the absence of 
corruption can be accessed through four government indicators (Law and order, 
bureaucratic quality, government stability and civil liberties). Analytically, it can be 
shown that the crucial means by which corruption adversely affects capital inflows is 
through an absence of law and order. Corruption can also be shown to lower capital 
productivity and the relationship with productivity can be traced to a variety of 
channels. Precisely, the mechanism through which corruption reduces productivity is 
the undermining of government stability. That is politician’s search for corrupt 
income is commonly in contrast to their declared programmes; reducing their 
popular support and threatening their ability to stay in office. In fact, when office 
holders devote themselves to obtaining illegal (additional) payoffs, the allocation of 
capital goods will be not be optimal, because they prefer projects that promise large 
side payments and low risks of detection to those benefit the public at large. Thus, 
reduced productivity is the result. Another mechanism is the link between corruption 
and restricted civil liberties. Regrettably, these restrictions tend to distort markets 
while inducing the search for illegal ways to circumvent them. In other words, 
distorting markets can be lucrative when corrupt politicians have the power to 
manage the resulting bottle necks. Yet, the crucial reason why corruption has an 
adverse impact on productivity is related to accompanying low levels of bureaucratic 
quality. Here corruption may imply that servants are appointed on the basis of 
nepotism or bribes, without regard to efficiency and capacity concerns. 
Furthermore, the effort level of public servants may suffer from adverse incentives 
because creating artificial bottlenecks can increase the need to pay ‘speed money.’ 
 Indeed, corruption can happen anywhere and when politicians put their own 
interests above those of the public as well as when officials demand money and 
favors from citizens for services that should be free.  
Therefore, corruption is not an envelope filled with money. Unfortunately, 
these people make decisions that affect our lives. Although, corruption is a global 
problem some attempts have been made to measure it consequently, corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 
countries worldwide (transparency international, 2012). Based on expert opinion, 
countries are scored form 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). Table 3.1 shows 
that some countries score well without any country scoring perfect 100, in fact, 2/3 
of the 176 countries ranked in the reported 2012 index score below 50, showing 
that public institutions need to be more transparent while powerful officials more 
accountable. Clearly, the CPI scores and ranks countries (territories) based on how 
corrupt a country’s sector is perceived to be. It is a composite index (Combination of 
surveys and assessments of corruption) collected by a variety of reputable 
institutions. As shown in table 3.1, a country territory’s score indicates the perceived 
level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 – 10. Here, zero means that a 
country is perceived as highly corrupt while a hundred means that a country is 
perceived as very clean. For a detailed disaggregation, scores 0 – 25 = very dirty 
country, scores 26 – 49 = dirty country; scores 50 – 75 = clean country and scores 
76 – 100 = very clean country specifically, a country’s rank indicates its position 
relative to other countries/territories included in the index. Generally, ranks can 
change merely if the number of countries included in the index changes. However, 
the corruption perceptions index is an indicator of perceptions of public sector 
corruption (administrative and political corruption). Perhaps, it may not be verdict 
on the levels of corruption of entire nations or societies (or of their policies) or the 
activities of their private sector. In other words, citizens of those countries 
(territories) that score at the lower end of the CPI may often show the same 
concern about and condemnation that perform strongly. Furthermore, the country 
(territory) with the lowest score is the one where public sector corruption is 
perceived to be the greatest among those included in the list. 
 
 
TABLE 3.1 GLOBAL CORRUPTION RECEPTIONS 
 
A B C D E F G 
S/N COUNTRY/TERRITORY CONTINENT/REGION SCORE RANK TRANSPARENCY 
STATUS 
INCOME 
STATUS 
1 DENMARK NORTHERN EUROPE 90 1 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
2 FINLAND NORTHERN EUROPE 90 1 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
3 NEW ZEALAND OCEANIA 90 1 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
4 SWEDEN NORTHERN EUROPE 88 4 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
5 SINGAPORE SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 87 5 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
6 SWITZERLAND WESTERN EUROPE 86 6 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
7 AUSTRALIA OCEANIA 85 7 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
8 NORWAY NORTHERN EUROPE 84 7 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
9 CANADA NORTHERN EUROPE 84 9 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
10 NETHERLANDS WESTERN EUROPE 84 9 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
11 ICELAND NORTHERN AMERICA 82 11 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
12 LUXEMBOURG WESTERN EUROPE 80 12 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
13 GERMANY WESTERN EUROPE 80 13 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
  
14 HONG KONG EASTERN ASIA 77 14 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
15 BARBADOS CARIBBEAN 76 15 VERY CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
16 BELGIUM WESTERN EUROPE 75 16 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
17 JAPAN EASTERN ASIA 74 17 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
18 UNITED KINGDOM NORTHERN ASIA 74 17 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
19 UNITED STATES NORTHERN AMERICA 73 19 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
20 CHILE SOUTH AMERICA 72 20 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
21 URUGUAY SOUTH AMERICA 72 20 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
22 BAHAMAS CARIBBEAN 71 22 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
23 FRANCE WESTERN EUROPE 71 22 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
24 SAINT LUCIA CARIBBEAN 71 22 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
25 AUSTRIA WESTERN EUROPE 69 25 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
26 IRELAND NORTHERN EUROPE 69 25 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
27 QATAR WESTERN ASIA 68 25 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
28 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WESTERN ASIA 68 27 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
29 CYPRUS WESTERN ASIA 66 29 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
A B C D E F G 
30 BOTSWANA SOUTHERN AFRICA 65 30 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
31 SPAIN SOUTHERN EUROPE 65 30 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
32 ESTONIA NORTHERN EUROPE 64 32 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
33 BHUTAN SOUTHERN ASIA 63 33 CLEAN LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
34 PORTUGAL SOUTHERN EUROPE 63 33 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
35 PUERTO RICO CARIBBEAN 63 33 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
36 SAINT VINCENT AND THE 
GRENADINES 
CARIBBEAN 62 36 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
37 SLOVENIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 61 37 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
38 TAIWAN ASIA 61 37 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
39 CAPE VERDE WEST AFRICA 60 39 CLEAN LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
40 ISREAL WESTERN ASIA 60 39 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
41 DOMINICA CARIBBEAN 58 41 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
42 POLAND EASTERN EUROPE 58 41 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
43 MALTA SOUTHERN EUROPE 57 43 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
44 MAURITIUS EASTERN AFRICA 57 43 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
45 KOREA (SOUTH) EASTERN ASIA 56 45 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
46 BRUNEI SOUTH-EATERN ASIA 55 46 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
47 HUNGARY EASTERN EUROPE 55 46 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
48 COSTA RICA CENTRAL AMERICA 54 48 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
49 LITHUANIA NORTHERN EUROPE 54 48 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
50 RWANDA EASTERN AFRICA 53 50 CLEAN LOWER INCOME 
51 GEORGIA WESTERN ASIA 52 51 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
52 SEYCHELLES EASTERN AFRICA 52 51 CLEAN UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
53 BAHARAIN WESTERN ASIA 51 53 CLEAN HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
 54 CZECH REPUBLIC EASTERN EUROPE 49 54 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
55 LATVIA NORTHERN EUROPE 49 54 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
56 MAYLASIA SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 49 54 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
57 TURKEY WESTERN ASIA 49 58 DIRTY LOW MIDDLE 
INCOME 
58 CUBA CARIBBEAN 48 58 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
59 JORDAN WESTERN ASIA 48 58 DIRTY 
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60 NAMBIA SOUTHERN AFRICA 48 58 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
61 OMAN WESTERN ASIA 47 61 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
62 CROATIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 46 62 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
63 SLOVAKIA EASTERN EUROPE 46 62 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
64 GHANA WEST AFRICA 45 64 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
65 LESOTHO SOUTHERN AFRICA 45 64 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
66 KUWAIT WESTERN ASIA 44 66 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
67 ROMANIA EASTERN EUROPE 44 66 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
68 SAUDI ARABIA WESTERN ASIA 44 66 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
NON-OECD 
69 BRAZIL SOUTH AMERICA 43 69 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
70 FYR MACEDONIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 43 69 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
71 SOUTH AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA 43 69 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
72 BOSINIA/HERZEGOVINA SOUTHERN EUROPE 42 69 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
73 ITALY SOUTHERN EUROPE 42 72 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
 
 
OECD 
74 SAD TOME/ PRINCIPLE CENTRAL AFRICA 42 72 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
75 BULGARIA EASTERN EUROPE 41 75 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
76 LIBERIA WESTERN AFRICA 41 75 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
77 MONTENEGRO SOUTHERN EUROPE 41 75 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
78 TUNISIA NORTHERN AFRICA 41 75 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
79 SRI LANKA SOUTHERN EUROPE 40 79 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
80 CHINA EASTERN ASIA 39 80 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
81 SERBIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 39 80 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
82 TRINIDAD/TOBAGO CARIBBEAN 39 80 DIRTY ---------------- 
83 BURKINA FASO WESTERN AFRICA 38 83 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
84 EL SALVADOR CENTRAL AMERICA 38 83 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
85 JAMAICA CARIBBEAN 38 83 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
86 PANAMA CENTRAL AMERICA 38 83 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
87 PERU SOUTH AMERICA 38 83 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
88 MALAWI EASTERN AFRICA 37 88 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
89 MOROCCO NORTHERN NORTHERN AFRICA 37 88 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
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90 SURINAME SOUTH AMERICA 37 88 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
91 SWAZILAND SOUTHERN AFRICA 37 88 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
92 THAILAND SOUTHERN ASIA 37 88 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
93 ZAMBIA EASTERN AFRICA 37 88 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
94 BENIN WESTERN AFRICA 36 94 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
95 COLOMBIA SOUTH AMERICA 36 94 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
96 DJIBOUTI EASTERN AFRICA 36 94 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
97 GREECE SOUTHERN EUROPE 36 94 DIRTY HIGH INCOME 
OECD 
98 INDIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 36 94 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
99 MOLDOVA EUROPE ASIA 36 94 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
100 MONGOLIA EASTERN ASIA 36 94 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
101 SENEGAL WEST AFRICA 36 94 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
102 ARGENTINA SOUTH AMERICA 35 102 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
103 GABON CENTRAL AFRICA 35 102 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
104 TANZANIA EASTERN AFRICA 35 105 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
105 ALGERIA NORTHERN AFRICA 34 105 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
106 ARMENIA EUROPE/ASIA 34 105 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
107 BOLIVIA SOUTH AMERICA 34 105 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
108 GAMBIA WESTERN  AFRICA 34 105 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
109 KOSOVO EUROPE/ASIA 34 105 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
110 MALI WEST AFRICA 34 105 DIRTY LOW INCOME 
111 MEXICO CENTRAL AMERICA 34 105 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
112 PHILLIPPINES SOUTH EASTERN ASIA 34 113 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
113 ALBANIA SOUTHERN EUROPE 33 113 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
114 ETHIOPIA EASTERN AFRICA 33 113 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
115 GUATEMALA CENTRAL AMERICA 33 113 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
116 NIGER WESTERN AFRICA 33 113 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
  
117 TIMOE-LESTE SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 33 113 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
118 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CARIBBEAN 32 118 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
119 ECUADOR SOUTH AMERICA 32 118 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
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120 EGYPT NORTHERN AFRICA 32 118 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
121 INDONESIA SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 32 118 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
122 MADAGASCAR EASTERN AFRICA 32 118 DIRTY LOWER  INCOME 
123 BELARUS EASTERN EUROPE 31 123 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
124 MAURITANIA WESTERN AFRICA 31 123 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
125 MOZAMBIQUE EASTERN AFRICA 31 123 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
126 SIERRALEONE WESTERN AFRICA 31 123 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
127 VIETNAM SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 31 123 DIRTY --------------- 
128 LEBENON WESTERN ASIA 30 128 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
129 TOGO WESTERN AFRICA 30 128 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
130 COTE D’IVORE WESTERN AFRICA 29 130 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
131 NICARAGUA CENTRAL AMERICA 29 130 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
132 UGANDA EASTERN AFRICA 29 130 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
133 COMOROS EASTERN AFRICA 28 133 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
134 GUYANA SOUTH AMERICA 28 133 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
135 HONDURAS CENTRAL AMERICA 28 133 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
136 IRAN CENTRAL ASIA 28 133 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
137 KAZAKHSTAN CENTRAL ASIA 28 133 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
138 RUSSIA EASTERN EUROPE 28 133 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 AZERBAIJAN WESTERN ASIA 27 139 DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
140 KENYA EASTERN AFRICA 27 139 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
141 NEPAL SOUTHERN ASIA 27 139 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
142 NIGERIA WESTERN AFRICA 27 139 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
143 PAKISTAN WESTERN ASIA 27 139 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
144 BANGLADASH SOUTHERN ASIA 26 144 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
145 CAMEROUN CENTRAL AFRICA 26 144 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
146 CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
CENTRAL AFRICA 26 144 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
147 CONGO REPUBLIC CENTRAL AFRICA 26 144 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
148 SYRIA WESTERN ASIA 26 144 DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
149 UKRAINE EASTERN EUROPE 26 144 DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
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150 ERITREA EASTERN AFRICA 25 150 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
151 GUINEA-BISSAU WESTERN AFRICA 25 150 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
152 PAPAU NEW GUINEA MELANESIA OCEANIA 25 150 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
153 PARAGUAY SOUTH AMERICA 25 150 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
154 GUINEA WESTERN AFRICA 24 154 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
155 KYRGYZSTAN CENTRAL ASIA 24 154 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
156 YEMEN WESTERN ASIA 23 156 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
157 ANGOLA CENTRAL AFRICA 22 157 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
158 CAMBODIA SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 22 157 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
159 TAJIKISTAN CENTRAL ASIA 22 157 VERY DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
160 CONGO DEM REP CENTRAL AFRICA 21 160 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
161 LAOS EAST ASIA/PACIFIC 21 160 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
162 LYBIA NORTH AFRICA 21 160 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
163 EQUATORIAL GUINEA WESTERN AFRICA 20 163 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
164 ZIMBABWE EASTERN AFRICA 20 163 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
165 BURUNDI EASTERN AFRICA 19 165 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
166 CHAD CENTRAL AFRICA 19 165 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
167 HAITI CARIBBEAN 19 165 VERY DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
168 VENEZUELA SOUTH AMERICA 19 165 VERY DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
169 IRAQ WESTERN ASIA 19 165 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
170 TURKMENISTAN CENTRAL ASIA 17 170 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
171 UZBEKISTAN CENTRAL ASIA 17 170 VERY DIRTY ---------------- 
172 MYANMAR SOUTH-EASTERN ASIA 15 172 VERY DIRTY UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
  
As shown in table 3.1, it is important to note that the income status column (World 
Bank, 2010) classifies all World Bank member economies as appropriate. Here, 
economies are divided among income groups according to 2008 GNI per capital that 
was calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. These groups are low income 
(LIC) = $975 or less; lower middle income (LMC) = $976 - $3855; and high income 
= $11,905 or more. 
 
 Again, the real impact of corruption any economy can be depicted very clearly 
using the failed state index (Fund for peace, 2012). Strictly, a failed state has 
several attributes and common indicators include a state whose central government 
is so weak or ineffective that is has little practical control over much of its territory; 
non-provision of public services wide spread corruption and criminality; refugees 
and involuntary movement of populations as well as sharp economic decline. 
Empirically, these are about twelve factors that are used to ascertain the health 
status of a country and these include social, economic and political factors. 
Specifically, the social factors include mounting demographic pressures; massive 
displacement of refugees and creating severe humanitarian emergencies; 
widespread vengeance seeking group grievance; chronic and sustained human 
flight. On one hand, the economic factors include uneven economic development 
along group lines as well as severe economic decline. On the other hand, the 
political factors include criminalization or delegitimization of the state; deterioration 
of public services; suspension or arbitrary application of law; widespread human 
173 SUDAN NORTHERN AFRICA 13 173 VERY DIRTY LOWER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
174 AFGHANISTAN CENTRAL ASIA 8 174 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
175 KOREA(NORTH) EASTERN ASIA 8 174 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
176 SOMALIA EASTERN AFRICA 8 174 VERY DIRTY LOWER INCOME 
right abuses; security apparatus operating as a “state within a state”; rise of 
fractionalized elites as well as intervention of external political agents. Table 3.2 
shows the detailed classification of failed state status of the various countries of the 
world. Evidently, it is very clear that most of the failed states belong to the most 
corrupt nations as well as terrorist nations of the world 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.2 GLOBAL CORRUPTION IMPACTS: FAILED STATES STATUS 
 
A B C D E F G H 
S/N COUNTRY FAILED 
STATE 
INDEX 
DANGER 
ALERT 
STATUS 
WARNING 
STATUS 
SUSTAINABLE 
STATUS 
RANK REGION 
1 SOMALIA 114.9 DANGER ---------- ----------- 1 EAST 
AFRICA 
2 CONGO, DEM. REP 111.2 DANGER ---------- ----------- 2 WEST 
AFRICA 
3 SUDAN 109.4 DANGER ---------- ----------- 3 NORTH 
AFRICA 
4 SOUTH SUDAN 108.4 DANGER ---------- ----------- ------ NORTH 
AFRICA 
5 CHAD 107.6 DANGER ---------- ----------- 4 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
6 ZIMBABWE 106.3 DANGER ---------- ----------- 5 EAST 
AFRICA 
7 AFGHANISTAN 106.0 DANGER ---------- ----------- 6 SOUTH 
ASIA 
8 HAITI 104.9 DANGER ---------- ----------- 7 CARIBBEAN 
9 YEMEM 104.8 DANGER ---------- ----------- 8 WEST ASIA 
10 IRAQ 104.3 DANGER ---------- ----------- 9 WEST ASIA 
11 CENTRAL AFRICA 
REPUBLIC11 
103.8 DANGER ---------- ----------- 10 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
12 IVORY COAST 103.6 DANGER ---------- ----------- 11 WEST 
AFRICA 
13 GUINEA 101.9 DANGER ---------- ----------- 12 WEST 
AFRICA 
14 PAKISTAN 101.6 DANGER ---------- ----------- 13 SOUTH 
ASIA 
15 NIGERIA 101.1 DANGER ---------- ----------- 14 WEST 
AFRICA 
16 GUINEA BISSAU 99.2 DANGER ---------- ----------- 15 WEST 
AFRICA 
17 KENYA 98.4 DANGER ---------- ----------- 16 EAST 
AFRICA 
18 ETHIOPIA 97.9 DANGER ---------- ----------- 17 EAST 
AFRICA 
18 BURUNDI 97.5 DANGER ---------- ----------- 18 EAST 
AFRICA 
20 NIGER 96.9 DANGER ---------- ----------- 19 WEST 
AFRICA 
21 UGANDA 96.5 DANGER ---------- ----------- 20 EAST 
AFRICA 
22 MYANMAR 96.2 DANGER ---------- ----------- 21 SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 
23 NORTH KOREA 95.5 DANGER ---------- ----------- 22 EAST ASIA 
24 ERITREA 94.5 DANGER ---------- ----------- 23 EAST 
AFRICA 
25 SYRIA 94.5 DANGER ---------- ----------- 24 WEST ASIA 
26 LIBERIA 93.3 DANGER ---------- ----------- 25 WEST 
AFRICA 
27 CAMEROUN 93.1 DANGER ---------- ----------- 26 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
28 NEPAL 93.0 DANGER ---------- ----------- 27 SOUTH 
ASIA 
 
 
 
 
 
A B C D E F G H 
29 EAST TIMOR 92.7 DANGER ---------- ---------- 28 SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 
30 BANGLADSEH 92.2 DANGER ---------- ----------- 29 SOUTH 
ASIA 
31 SRI LANKA 92.2 DANGER ---------- ----------- 30 AOUTH 
ASIA 
32 SIERRA LEONE 90.4 DANGER ---------- ----------- 31 WEST 
AFRICA 
33 EGYPT 90.4 DANGER ---------- ----------- 32 NORTH 
AFRICA 
34 CNGO REP 90.1 DANGER ---------- ----------- 33 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
35 IRAN 89.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 34 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
36 RWANDA 89.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 35 EAST 
AFRICA 
37 MALAWI 88.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 36 EAST 
AFRICA 
38 CAMBODIA 88.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 37 SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 
39 MAURITANIA 87.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 38 WEST 
AFRICA 
40 TOGO 87.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 39 WEST 
AFRICA 
41 UZBEKISTAN 87.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 40 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
42 BURKINA FASO 87.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 41 WEST 
AFRICA 
43 KYRGYZSTAN 87.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 42 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
44 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 86.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 43 WEST 
AFRICA 
45 ZAMBIA 85.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 44 EAST 
AFRICA 
46 LEBENON 85.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 45 WEST 
AFRICA 
47 TAJIKISTAN 85.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 46 CENRTRAL 
ASIA 
48 SOLOMON ISLANDS 85.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 47 MELANESIA 
49 LAOS 85.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 48  
50 ANGOLA 85.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 49 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
51 LIBYA 84.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 50 NRTH 
AFRICA 
52 GEORGIA 84.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 51  
53 COLOMBIA 84.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 52 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
54 DJIBOUTI 83.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 53 EAST 
AFRICA 
55 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 83.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 54 MELANASIA 
56 SWAZILAND 83.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 55 SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
57 PHILLIPPINES 83.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 56 SOUTH-
EAST ASIA 
58 COMOROS 83.0 
 
---------- WARNING ----------- 57 EASTERN 
AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
A B C D E F G H 
59 MADAGASCAR 82.5 ---------- WARNING ---------- 58 EAST 
AFRICA 
60 MOZAMBIQUE 82.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 59 EAST 
AFRICA 
61 BHUTAN 82.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 60 SOUTH 
ASIA 
62 ISREAL/WEST BANK 82.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 61 WEST ASIA 
63 BOLIVIA 82.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 62 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
64 INDONESIA 80.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 63 SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 
65 GAMBIA 80.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 64 WEST 
AFRICA 
66 FIJI 80.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 65 MELANESIA 
67 TANZANIA 80.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 66 EAST 
AFRICA 
68 ECUADOR 80.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 67 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
69 AZERBAIJAN 79.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 68 WEST ASIA 
70 NICARAGUA 79.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 69 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
71 GUATEMALA 79.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 70 CENTRAL 
AMERIA 
72 SENEGAL 79.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 71 WEST 
AFRICA 
73 LESOTHO 79.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 72 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
74 MOLDOVA 78.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 73  
75 BENIN 78.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 74 WEST 
AFRICA 
76 HONDURAS 78.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 75 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
77 CHINA 78.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 76 EAST ASIA 
78 ALGERIA 78.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 77 NORTH 
AFRICA 
79 INDIA 78.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 78 SOUTH 
ASIA 
80 MALI 77.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 79 WEST 
AFRICA 
81 BOSNIA/HERZEGOVINA 77.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 80 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
82 TURKMENISTAN 77.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 81 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
83 VENEZUELA 77.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 82 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
84 RUSSIA 77.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 83 EAST 
EUROPE 
85 THAILAND 77.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 84 SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 
86 TURKEY 76.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 85 WEST ASIA 
87 BELARUS 76.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 86 EAST 
EUROPE 
88 MOROCCO 76.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 87 NORHERN 
AFRICA 
 
 
A B C D E F G H 
89 MALDIVES 75.1 ---------- WARNING ---------- 88  
90 SERBIA (ONLY) 75.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 89 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
91 JORDAN 74.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 90 WEST ASIA 
92 CAPE VERDE 74.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 91 WEST 
AFRICA 
93 GABON 74.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 92 WEST 
AFRICA 
94 ELSALVADOR 74.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 93  
95 TUNISIA 74.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 94 NORTH 
AFRICA 
96 DUMINICAN REPUBLIC 74.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 95 CARIBBEAN 
97 VIETNAM 74.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 96 SOUTH EAST 
ASIA 
98 SAD TOME/PRINCIPE 73.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 97 CENTRAL 
AFRICA 
99 MEXICO 73.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 98 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
100 PERU 73.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 99 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
101 SAUDI ARABIA 73.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 100 WEST ASIA 
102 CUBA 73.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 101 CARIBBEAN 
103 ARMENIA 72.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 102 WEST ASIA 
104 MICRONESIA (F.S) 71.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 103 MICRONESIA 
105 GUYANA 71.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 104 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
106 SURINAME 71.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 105 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
107 NAMIBIA 71.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 106 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
108 PARAGUAY 70.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 107 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
109 KAZAKHSTAN 70.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 108 CENTRAL 
ASIA 
110 MACEDONIA (REP) 69.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 109 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
111 SAMOA 68.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 110 POLYNESIA 
112 MALAYSIA 68.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 111 SOUTH EAST 
ASIA 
113 GHANA 67.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 112 WEST 
AFRICA 
114 UKARAINE 67.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 113 EAST 
EUROPE 
115 BELIZE 67.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 114 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
116 SOUTH AFRICA 66.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 115 SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
117 CYPRUS 66.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 116 WEST ASIA 
118 BOTSWANA 66.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 117 SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B C D E F G H 
119 ALBANIA 66.1 ---------- WARNING ---------- 118 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
120 JAMAICA 65.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 119 CARIBBEAN 
121 SEYCHELLES 65.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 120 EAST 
AFRICA 
122 GRENADA 65.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 121 EAST 
AFRICA 
123 TRINIDAD 64.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 122 CARIBBEAN 
124 BRAZIL 64.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 123  
125 BRUNEI 64.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 124 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
126 BAHRAIN 62.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 125  
127 ROMANIA 59.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 126 SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 
128 ANTIGUA/BARBUDA 58.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 127 CARIBBEAN 
129 KUWAIT 58.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 128 WEST ASIA 
130 MONGOLIA 58.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 129 EAST ASIA 
131 BULGARIA 56.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 130 EAST 
EUROPE 
132 CROATIA 56.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 131 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
133 PANAMA 56.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 132 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
134 MONTENGRO 55.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 133 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
135 BAHAMAS 55.1 ---------- WARNING ----------- 134 CARIBBEAN 
136 BARBADOS 52.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 135 CARIBBEAN 
137 LATVIA 51.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 136 NORTH 
EUROPE 
138 OMAN 51.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 137 WEST ASIA 
139 GREECE 50.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 138 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
140 COSTA RICA 49.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 139 CENTRAL 
AMERICA 
141 UNITED ARAB 
EMIRATES 
48.9 ---------- WARNING ----------- 140 WEST ASIA 
142 HUNGARY 48.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 141 EAST 
EUROPE 
143 QATAR 48.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 142 WEST ASIA 
144 ESTONIA 47.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 143 NORTH 
EUROPE 
145 SLOVAKIA 47.4 ---------- WARNING ----------- 144 EAST 
EUROPE 
146 ARGENTINA 46.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 145 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
147 ITALY 45.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 146 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
148 MAURITIUS 44.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 147 EAST 
,AFRICA 
 
A B C D E F G H 
149 POLAND 44.3 ---------- WARNING ---------- 148 EAST 
EUROPE 
150 LITHUNIA 44.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 149 NORTH 
EUROPE 
151 MALTA 43.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 150 SOUTH 
EAUROPE 
152 CHILE 43.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 151 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
153 JAPAN 43.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 152 EAST ASIA 
154 SPAIN 42.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 153 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
155 URUGUAY 40.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 154 SOUTH 
AMERICA 
156 CZECH REPUBLIC 39.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 155 EAST 
EUROPE 
157 SOUTH KOREA 37.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 156 EAST ASIA 
158 SNGAPORE 35.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 157 SOUTH 
EAST ASIA 
159 UNITED KINGDOM 35.3 ---------- WARNING ----------- 158 NORTH 
EUROPE 
160 UNITED STATES 34.8 ---------- WARNING ----------- 159 NORTH 
AMERICA 
161 PORTUGAL 34.2 ---------- WARNING ----------- 160 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
162 SLOVENIA 34.0 ---------- WARNING ----------- 161 SOUTH 
EUROPE 
163 FRANCE 33.6 ---------- WARNING ----------- 162 WEST 
,EUROPE 
164 BELGIUM 33.5 ---------- WARNING ----------- 163 WEST 
EUROPE 
165 GERMANY 31.7 ---------- WARNING ----------- 164 WEST 
EUROPE 
166 AUSTRALIA 29.2 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 165 OCEANIA 
167 ICELAND 29.1 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 166 NORTH 
EUROPE 
168 NETHERLANDS 28.1 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 167 WEST 
EUROPE 
169 AUSTRIA 27.5 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 168 WEST 
EUROPE 
170 CANADA 26.8 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 169 NORTH 
AMERICA 
171 IRELAND REP 26.5 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 170 NORTH 
EUROPE 
172 NEW ZEALAND 25.6 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 171 OCEANIA 
173 LUXEMBORG 25.5 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 172 WEST 
EUROPE 
174 NORWAY 23.9 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 173 NORTH 
EUROPE 
175 SWITZERLAND 23.3 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 174 WEST 
EUROPE 
176 DENMARK 23.0 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 175 NORTH 
EUROPE 
177 SWEDEN 21.3 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 176 NORTH 
EUROPE 
178 FINLAND 20.0 ---------- ----------- SUSTAINABLE 177 NORTH 
EUROPE 
 4.0  AFRICAN REGIONAL CONFLICTS 
 
 Indeed, Africa is the second largest of the earth’s continents and it comprises 
about twenty two percent of the world’s total land area. Most of the Africa’s 
population lives in the region south of the Sahara (that is known as sub-Sahara 
Africa). The continent was home to one of the world’s first great civilizations 
(Egyptian empire) that were unified more than five thousand years ago. However, 
the last five hundred years in Africa have been dominated by foreign colonization, 
political and ethnic struggles that have hampered socio-industrial development. 
Perhaps, Africans are the most culturally diverse of any continent’s inhabitants (with 
thousands of ethnic groups as well as thousands of different languages). With 
ethnicities that often cross national boundaries and continual political upheavals, 
African national identity is not as strong as racial tires or local kin group affiliations. 
However, since the 1950s, most African nations have gained independence from 
their former colonial powers. Regrettably, conflict (especially in the form of civil war) 
is not a new phenomenon in Africa. In fact, the last four decades have seen many 
civil wars and coups d’états. Yet, the last twenty years have seen a disturbing 
escalation in the violence. Specifically, over these decades, there have been at least 
twenty major conflicts in Africa (Addison et al, 2001; Annan, 1998; Clarke and 
Herbst, 1997; Gourevitch, 1998). Here, one feature clearly stands out and there are 
economic factors which play a large role in determining the action of actual and 
potential belligerents. In fact, table 4.1 shows that in a number of cases, war is 
closely associated with economies relying on natural resource exploitation (Balencie 
and Grange, 1999). In other words, the war economies sustaining belligerents 
depend on revenues from natural resources and reach a point at which economic 
(rather than political) motives become dominant. Thus, the revenue from fertile land 
capable of producing an export crop (bananas) was one of the prizes that Somalia’s 
war lords sought to capture. Indeed, the nature and location of natural resources 
affects the occurrence of war. Consequently, two main type of resource can be 
identified. On one hand, there are point resources such as minerals that are non-
renewable, geographically concentrated; and their extraction requires little labor 
input. On the other hand, there are diffuse resources such as soils and water that 
are renewable, geographically spread; and are usually used in the production of 
crops and livestock while mobilizing large amounts of labor. Therefore, countries 
that are abundant in point resources are more likely to experience conflict than 
countries that possess only state of affairs in most other African countries was 
nearly as bleak. As marauding gangs were raiding villages, rebels were 
 
TABLE 4.1 AFRICAN CONFLICTS: NATIONAL RESOURCES ROLE 
 
A B C D E F 
S/N COUNTRY DATE DEATHS POINT RESOURCES DIFFUSE RESOURCES 
1 ALGERIA 1992 70,000 OIL/GAS  
2 ANGOLA 1975 500,000 OIL/DIAMONDS TIMBER/IVORY 
3 CAMEROUN 1997 < 1,000 OIL  
4 CHAD 1980 – 94 300,000 OIL/URANIUM  
5 CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE 1993 1997 9,000 OIL  
6 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
OF CONGO/ZAIRE 
1993 - 200,000 COPPER/COBALT/ 
DIAMONDS/GOLD 
TIMBER 
7 KENYA 1991 - 2,000  CATTLE 
8 LIBERIA 1989 – 96 175,000 IRON/DIAMONDS/RUBBER TIMBER/DRUGS 
9 MOZAMBIQUE 1976 – 95 1,000,000  SHRIMPS9/IVORY/TIMBER 
10 RWANDA 1990 - 650,000  COFFEE 
11 SENEGAL 1997 - < 1,000  DRUGS 
12 SIERRA LEONE 1991 – 1999 80,000 DIAMONDS/RATTLE 
BAUXITE 
TIMBER 
13 SOMALIA 1988 - -----------  BANANAS/CAMELS 
14 SOUTH AFRICA 1990s 200, 000  DRUGS 
15 SUDAN 1983 - 1,6000,000 OIL CATTLE/TIMBER 
16 WESTERN SAHARA 1976 - -------------- PHOSPHATES  
 plundering and carrying out sexual assaults across borders. As illegal miners are 
poaching gold and diamond mines, killing and maiming to have their way, so also 
refugees and displaced people are besieging neighboring towns and countries like 
locusts. Yet, on their part, political leader are either busy looting their country’s 
treasures or maneuvering to rule for life.  
 Thus, in Africa, wars and conflicts have not only helped over ambitious leaders 
to perpetuate themselves in office but (worst still) they have become a policy for 
economic sustenance of both the ruling and the opposition parties within the same 
country as well as of governments of warring nations in cross-border conflicts. 
Unfortunately, the political history of Africa could easily be written as a running tale 
of struggles, civil war and armed conflicts. These vices are closely linked to the 
unwillingness or inability of social groups and their leaders to move beyond the 
boundaries of religion, ethnicity and race. In fact, researchers have found out that 
Africa has the highest incidence of civil wars among world regions. While war 
incidence has fallen or remained constant in other regions in the last three decades, 
it has actually increased in Africa. More than the inter-state wars, the war within the 
countries created more problems for the regions in Africa. And besides the influx of 
refugees, which tasks the treasuries of the neighbors of the warring states, the 
security of the neighbors is threatened. Here, the victims are not only the millions 
who died on the battle sacked by fighters. That is, even those who are alive are 
equally victims. Thus, the effects of civil war on economic growth can be identified 
as follows: destruction of physical and human capital, reduction of savings, diversion 
of portfolios from domestic investment to capital flight, disruption of economic 
transactions and distortion of government expenditure from the provision of public 
services to military expenditure, Even after the war, many of the rebels have 
constituted themselves into ethnic armies this ugly development may be because of 
a permanent insecurity created by conflicts. Notably, the trend in these countries 
that are not fighting war is the uprising of ethnic armies rising to defend their clans. 
Yet, the tendency to see violence as interstate warfare and major civil war obscures 
the variety and prevalence of organized violence and underestimates its impact on 
people’s lives. Here, the organized violence that disrupts governance and 
compromise development also includes local violence involving militias or between 
ethnic groups, gang violence, local resource-related violence and violence linked to 
trafficking (such as drug trafficking) as well as violence associated with global 
ideological struggles.  
 Sa shown in table (4.2), this violence is often recurrent, with many African 
countries now experiencing repeated cycles of civil conflicts and criminal violence 
(World Bank, 2011). For instance, countries rich in oil and other minerals that can 
be illegal trafficked are much more likely to have a civil war (and longer one) with 
rebels financing their activity through the sale of loot able resources. In other cases, 
violence may be linked through underlying institutional weakness. But violence 
between political rivals, quasi-political extortion and criminal gang activity has 
increased markedly since the civil war. Yet, the modern landscape of violence also 
includes terrorist attacks by movements that claim ideological motives and recruit 
internationally. In fact, where conflict has ended, recovery and the creation of 
resilient institutions take time, and the weakness of governance in post – conflict 
environments attracts transnational criminal networks. Clearly, organized crime 
networks engage in a wide variety of illicit activities, including trafficking drugs, 
people, small arms and light weapons; financial crimes and money laundering. 
These illicit activities require the absence of rule of law and often thrive in countries 
affected by other forms of violence. In other words, counties affected by political 
violence that have weak institutions are susceptible to trafficking. Regrettably, the 
costs of violence for citizens, communities, countries and the region are enormous 
both in terms of human suffering as well as socio-economic consequences. Here, 
the costs are both direct (loss of life, disability and destruction) as well as indirect 
(prevention, instability and displacement). While some of these losses can be 
directly measured and quantified in economic terms, others are not easily measured 
(trauma, loss of social capital and trust, prevention cost, forgone investment and 
trade). Notably, the most vulnerable groups in society are frequently most affected 
by violence. Tied to their homes or places of work, the vulnerable have little of the 
protection that money or well placed contacts afford. In fact, poor child nutrition for 
those displaced or unable to earn incomes due to violence has lasting effects; 
impairing physical and cognitive functioning. Again, violence destroys school 
infrastructure, displaces teachers and interrupts schooling; often for an entire 
generation of poor children. Similarly, war looting and crime destroy the household 
assets of the poor while fear of violent attacks prevent them from tilling their field 
or traveling to schools, clinics, work places and markets. In particular, for poor 
people in poor African countries, extended families are often their only insurance 
while deaths in the family often leave them alone and up rotated. 
 In addition to the human suffering, organized 
 
TABLE 4.2 MULTIPLE VIOLENCE FORMS: AFRICAN CASE 
A B C D E F G 
S/N COUNTRY 
(REGION) 
LOCAL INTER 
GROUP 
CONFLICT 
“CONVENTIONAL” 
CONFLICT/CONSTESIS 
FOR STATE POWER OR 
FOR AUTONOMY OR 
INDEPENDENCE  
WIDESPREAD 
GONG 
RELATED 
VIOLENCE  
ORGANISED 
CRIME OR 
TRAFFICKING 
WITH 
ACCOMPANYI
NG VIOLENCE  
LOCAL 
CONFLICTS 
WITH 
TRANSNATIO
NAL 
IDEOLOGICAL 
CONNECTION
S  
1 MALI  (WEST 
AFRICAN)  
Rebel infighting 
(1994): ethnic 
violence in GAO, 
Kayes, and Kindal 
regions (1998-99) 
Rebel groups in Northern Mali 
(1990-present) 
 Transnational 
trafficking of 
illicit goals, 
principally drugs 
and weapons  
AL-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb  
2 KENYA Clan and ethnic Election violence  Widespread Drug trafficking  
group violence 
(2005-2008) 
gang activity 
(1980s-present)  
hub, particularly 
for heroin 
 
Violence poses social and economic costs that can dwarf the impact of other events 
of concern, such as economic shocks and natural disasters. In fact, the development 
consequences of violence (like its origin) spill across borders, with implications for 
neighbors and for the region. In other words, violence in one country can create a 
“bad neighborhood”. Notably, nearly 75 percent of the world’s refugees are hosted 
by neighboring countries. For example, refugees from Liberia and Togo have sought 
shelter in Ghana for extended periods; straining the state’s ability to deliver services 
and opening tensions with the local population. 
 Obliviously, political and criminal violence both disrupt development and occur 
in repeated cycles. It is therefore essential to look across that spectrum and to 
consider local conflicts, social protest, gang violence, organized crime, and 
transnational terrorism alongside the major civil war that have been the focus of 
most researchers. Thus, this interlocking landscape raises questions about the 
coherence of the approaches to deal with these various forms of 
violence/approaches often divorced from one another as well as the treatment of 
post-conflict reconstruction and prevention as separate problems. Definitely, the 
risks of violence and the responses to it are shared by countries across divides of 
income, national identity, religion, and ideology in Africa. Thus, the way forward 
remains a continental challenge.  
 
 
 
 
 
5.0 NIGERIA DISINTEGRATION MOVEMENT 
  From the time of amalgamation of the Northern and Southern 
protectorates along with the colony of Lagos in 1914, the earliest political structure 
of Nigeria was predicated on unitarism. However, the chronology of British Governor 
General of the Nigeria federation is identified as follows: Sir Fredrick Lugard (1912-
1919), Sir Hugh Clifford (1919-1925), Sir Creamer Thompson (1925-1931), Sir 
Cameron (1931-1935), GR.B. Bourdillion (1935-1943), Sir A. Richard (1943-1945), 
Sir John Machperson (1945-58) and Sir James Roberson (1958-1960). In fact, a 
quasi-federal structure by way of regionalism was established in Nigeria under the 
1946 Richard’s constitution, which closed the era of the colonial unitary 
arrangement specifically, events in the early 1950s (which prompted a demand for 
dissolution of Nigeria as a political entity) led to the immediate inception of the 
Lyttleton constitution (Nwokocha, 2007). During this period, two Southern regions 
(East and west) demanded for self government, but the motion was opposed by the 
Northern delegation. Despite several disagreements, eastern and Western region 
became self-governing in 1957 while the Northern region followed in 1959. 
However, the 1958 London conference reached decisions on holding of a general 
election in 1959 and the granting of independence to Nigeria on October 1, 1960. 
With this independence, a new constitutional Monarch in the person of the Queen, 
who was represented in Nigeria by a native (Governor- General Nnamdi Azikiwe). 
Again, it established a National parliament made up of the Queen, the Senate and 
House of Representatives. Here, each of the three regions was to have a house of 
assembly and House of Chiefs. Thus, on October 1, 1963, a new constitution known 
as the Republican constitution came into force; thereby, giving the country a 
republican status under the federal arrangement.  
 Subsequently, the civil bureaucracy (which had largely transited from the 
colonial overhands to indigenous hands) consisted of a federal service and a civil 
service for each of the four regions (inclusive of mid – western Region). 
Regrettably, from 1962 to 1965, the federation of Nigeria was in a constant state of 
tumult as it was marked by crisis and conflicts manifest in the western crisis of 
1962; 1963 census fiasco; 1964 general election malpractices as well as fraudulent 
western regional elections. Rather than address its mid to the internal problems, the 
incumbent Nigeria prime minister (Sir Abubakar Belewa) was only interested in 
hosting the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting. Consequently, the persisting 
crisis culminated in the military takeover of government in January 1966 with 
General Ironsi as head of state. Indeed, the return to the federal structure under 
General Gowon (after General Ironsi’s overthrow in July 1966) gave federalism a 
new impetus. On the continuity of the Eastern Nigeria to opt out of the Nigerian 
Union was stopped by force of arms and economic blockade as well as states 
creation Decree N0. 14 (1967). Under this decree, Nigeria has divided into eleven 
states with military governors (except for East central state that has a civilian 
administrator). However, Gowon’s leadership was challenged by the military 
Governor of Easter Nigeria (Lt. Col. Ojukwu) who argued that on Ironsi’s exit, it 
was the most senior army officer that should take over the government. 
Unfortunately, the resultant strained relationship between the central government 
and Eastern Nigeria (among other reasons) culminated in a very devastating civilian 
war between 1967 and 1970. Yet, with the fall of Gowon in July, 1975 and the 
arrival of General Murtala, the federal structure was given further impetus by the 
addition of seven more states.  
 In this era, General Murtala replaced thousands of civil servants and around a 
time table for the resumption of civilian rule. But he was assassinated on February 
13, 1976 in an abortive coup and his Chief of staff (Gen Olusegun Obasanjo) 
became the new head of state. Subsequently, a constituent was elected in 1977 to 
draft a new constitution while the ban on political party was lifted in 1978. Thus, in 
1979, five political parties competed in a series of elections in which Alhaji Shehu 
Shagari was elected president. Again in August 1983, Shehu Shagari and his 
party (NPN) were returned to power with a majority of seats in the National 
Assembly. However, the elections were marred by violence and allegations of 
widespread vote rigging as well as electoral malpractices. Therefore on December, 
1983, the military overthrow the incumbent government and General Buhari 
emerged as the leader of Supreme Military Council (SMC). And yet, in August 1985, 
the Buhari government was overthrown by General Ibrahim Babangida, who 
cited the government’s failure to deal with the country’s deepening economic crisis 
as the major takeover, justifications. In 1989, a constituent assembly completed a 
constitution as well as the establishment of two political parties by the government. 
After several years of preparation, the presidential election was eventually held on 
June 12, 1993 with the inauguration of the new president scheduled to take place 
on August 27, 1993 (with M.K.O. Abiola as President elect in contest). However, 
on June 23, Babangida (using several pending law suits as pretence) annulled the 
election and thereby throwing Nigeria into an uncontrollable turmoil. Against his 
wish, Babangida was forced to hand over to Ernest Shonekan (on August 27, 
1993) to form an interim government. As planned, Ernest was to rule until elections 
scheduled for February 1994. Notably, General Babangida created additional eleven 
states during his administrative era.  
 With the country sliding into a chaos General Sani Abacha assumed power 
and forced Shonekan’s resignation on November 17, 1993. Although promising 
restoration of civilian rule, he refused to announce a transitional timetable until 
1995. Abacha created additional six states and eventually died of heart attack on 
June 8, 1998. Thus, table 5.1 shows disaggregated information on the thirty – six 
states of Nigeria as created. On replacing Abacha, General Abdulsalani 
Abubakar (in August 1998) appointed the independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) to conduct elections for local government councils, state 
legislatures, governors, national assembly and president. Subsequently, former 
military head of state Olusegun Obasanjo (freed from prison by Abubakar) ran as a 
civilian candidate and won the presidential election. In this era, the provisional 
ruling council also promulgated a new constitution based largely on the suspended 
1979 constitution (before the inauguration of the new civilian president on May 29, 
1999). Here, the new constitution also includes provisions for a bicameral 
legislative. National Assembly: 360 House of Representatives members and 109 
senate members.  
  
TABLE 5.1 NIGERIA FEDERATIONS: 36STATES STRUCTURE 
A B C D E F G 
S/N STATE 
NAME 
FOUNDAT
ION DATE 
STATE 
CAPITAL 
REGIONAL 
ZONE 
L.G.A. 
NUMBERS 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA (LGA) 
NAMES 
1 ABIA (ABI)  1991 UMUAHIA  SOUTH EAST 
(SE)  
17 ABA NORTH, ABA SOUTH, 
AROCHUKWU, BENDE, IKWUANO, 
ISIALA-NGWA SOUTH, ISUIKWUATO, 
OBI NGWA, OHAFIA, OSISIOMA 
NGWA, UGWUNAGBO, UKWA EAST, 
UKWA WEST, UMUAHIA NORTH, 
UMUAHIA SOUTH, UMU-NNEOCHI.  
2 ADAMAWA 
(ADA)  
1976 YOLA  NORTH EAST 
(NE)  
21 DEMSA, FUFORE, GANYE, GIREI, 
GOMBI, GUYUK, HONG, JADA, 
LAMURDE, MADAGALI, MAIHA, MAYO-
BELWA, MICHIKA, MUBI NORTH, MUBI 
SOUTH, NUMAN, SHELLENG, SONG, 
TOUNGO, YOLA NORTH, YOLA SOUTH.  
3 AKWA-
IBOM 
(AKW)  
1987 UYO  SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
31 ABAK, EASTERN OBOLO, EKET, ESIT 
EKET, ESSIEN UDIM, ETIM EKPO, 
ETINAN, IBENO, IBESIKPO ASUTAN, 
IBIONO IBOM, IKA, IKONO, IKOT 
ABASI, IKOT-EKPENE, INI, ITU, MBO, 
MKPAT ENIN, NSIT ATAI, NSIT IBOM, 
NSIT UBIUM, OBOT AKARA, OKOBO, 
ONNA, ORON, ORUK ANAM, UDUNG 
UKA, UKANAFUN, URUAN, URUE-
OFFONGJORUKO, UYO.  
4 ANAMBRA 
(ANA) 
1991 AWKA  SOUTH EAST 
(SE)  
21 AGUATA, ANAMBRA EAST, ANAMBRA 
WEST, ANAOCHA NORTH, AWKA 
SOUTH, AYAMELUM, DUNUKOFIA, 
EKWUSIGO, IDEMILI NORTH, IDEMILI 
SOUTH, IHIALA, NJIKOKA, NNEWI 
NORTH, NNEWI SOUTH, OGBARU, 
ONITSHA NORTH, ONITSHA SOUTH, 
ORUMBA NORTH, ORUMBA SOUTH, 
OYI.  
5 BAUCHI 
(BAU)  
1976 BAUCHI  NORTH EAST 
(NE)  
20  ALKATERI, BAUCHI, BOGORO, 
DAMBAN, DARAZO, DASS, GARNAWA, 
GANJUWA, GIADE, ITAS/GADAU, JAMA 
ARE, KATAGUM, KIRFI, MISAU, NINGI, 
SHIRA, TAFAWA-BALEWA, TORO, 
WARJI, ZAKI.  
6 BAYELSA 
(BAY)  
1996 YENGOA  SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
32  BRASS, EKEREMOR, KOLOKUMA-
OPOKUMA, NEMBE, OGBIA, SAGBAMA, 
SOUTHERN IJAW, YENEGOA.  
7 BENUE 
(BEN)  
1976  MARKURDI  NORTH  
CENTRAL (NC)  
23  ADO, AGATU, APA, BURUKU, GBOKO, 
GUMA, GWER-EAST, GWER WEST, 
KATSINA-ALA, KONSHISHA, KWANDE, 
LOGO, MAKURDI, OBI, OGBADIBO, 
OJU, OKPOKWU, OHIMINI, OTURKPO, 
TARKA, UKUM, USHONGO, 
VENDEIKYA.  
8 BORNO 
(BOR)  
1967 MAIDUGURI  NORTH EAST 
(NE)  
27 ABADAM, ASKIRA/UBA, BAMA, BAYO, 
BIU, CHOBOK, DAMBOA, DIKWA, 
GUBIO, GUZAMALA, GWOZA, HAWUL, 
JERE, KAGA, KALA/BALGE, KONDUGA, 
KUKAWA, KWAYA, KUSAR, MAFA, 
MAGUMERI, MAIDUGURI, MARTE, 
MOBBAR, MONGUNO, NGALA, 
NGANZAI, SHANI.  
9 CROSS 
RIVER 
(CRR)  
1967  CALABAR  SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
18  ABI, AKAMKPA, AKPABUYO, BAKASSI, 
BEKWARA, BIASE, BOKI, CALABAR-
MUNICIPAL, CALABAR SOUTH, ETUNG, 
IKOM, OBANLIKU, OBUBRA, OBUDU, 
ODUKPANI, OGOJA, YAKURR, YALA.  
10 DELTA 
(DEL)  
1991 ASABA  SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
25  ANIOCHA NORTH, ANIOCHA SOUTH, 
MONADI, BURUTU ETHIOPE EAST, 
ETHIOPE WEST, IKA NORTH EAST, IKA 
SOUTH, ISOKO NORTH, ISOKO 
SOUTH, NDOKWA EAST, NDOKWA 
WEST, OKPE, OSHIMILI NORTH, 
OSHIMILI SOUTH, PATANI, SAPELE, 
UDU, UGHELLI NORTH, UGHELLI 
SOUTH, UKWUANI, UVWIE, WARRI 
NORTH, WARRI SOUTH, WARRI 
SOUTH WEST 
11 EBONYI 
(EBO)  
1996 ABAKILIKI  SOUTH EAST 
(SS)  
13 ABAKALIKI, AFIKPO NORTH, AFIKPO 
SOUTH, EBONYI, EZZA NORTH, EZZA 
SOUTH, IKWO, ISHIELU, IVO, IZZI, 
OHAOZARA, OHAUKWU, ONICHA.  
12 EDO 
(EDO)  
1963/67 BENIN CITY  SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
18 AKOKO-EDO, EGOR, ESAN CENTRAL, 
ESAN NORTH EAST, ESAN SOUTH 
EAST, ESAN WEST, ETSAKO CENTRAL, 
ETSAKO EAST, ETSAKO WEST, 
IGUEBEN, IKPOBA-OKHA, OREDO, 
ORHIONMWON, OVIA NORTH EAST, 
OVIA SOUTH WEST, OWAN EAST, 
OWAN WEST, UHUNMWONDE.  
13 EKITI(EKI)  1996 EDO-EKITI SOUTH WEST 
(SW)  
16 ADO EKITI, AIYEKIRE, EFON, EKITI 
EAST, EKITI SOUTH WST, EKITI WEST, 
EMURE, IDO-OSI, IJERO, IKERE, 
IKOLE, LLEJEMEJI, 
IREPODUN/IFELODUN, ISE/ORUN, 
MOBA, OYE.  
14 ENUGU 
(ENU)  
1946/67 ENUGU  SOUTH EAST 
(SE)  
17  ANINRI, AWGU, ENUGU EAST, ENUGU 
NORTH, ENUGU SOUTH, EZEAGU, 
IGBO-ETITI, IGBO-EZE NORTH, IGBO-
EZE SOUTH, ISI-UZO, NKANU EAST, 
NKANU WEST, NSUKKA, OJI-RIVER, 
UDENU, UDI, UZO-UWANI.  
15 GOMBE 
(GOM)  
1996 GOMBE  NORTH EAST 
(NE)  
10 AKKO, BALANGA, BILLIRI, DUKKU, 
FUNAKAYE, GOMBE, KALTUNGO, 
KWAMI, NAFADA, SHOMGOM, 
YAMALTU/DEBA.  
16 IMO (IMO)  1976 OWERRI  SOUTH EAST 
(SE) 
27 ABOH-MBAISE, AHIAZU-MBAISE, 
EHIME-MBANO, EZINIHITTE, IDEATO 
NORTH, IDEATO SOUTH, 
IHITTE/UBOMA, IKEDURU, ISIALA 
MBANO, ISU, MBAITOLI, NGOR-
OKPALA, NJABA, NWANGELE, 
NKWERRE, OBOWO, OGUTA, 
OHAJI/EGBEMA, OKIGWE, ORLU, 
ORSU, ORU EAST, ORU WEST, 
OWERRI-MUNICIPAL, OWERRI NORTH, 
OWERRI WEST, UNUIMO.  
17 JIGAWAA 
(JIG)  
1991 DUBE  NORTH WEST  27  AUYO, BABURA, BIRNIN, KUDU, 
BIRINIWA, BUJI, DUTSE, GAGARAWA, 
GARKI, GUMEL, GURI, GWARAM, 
GWIWA, HADEJIA, JAHUN, KAFIN 
HAUSA, KAUGAMA, KAZATJRE, KIRI-
KASAMMA, KIYAWA, MAIGATARI, 
MALAM MADORI, MIGA, RINGIM, 
RONI, SULE-TANKARKAR, TAURA, 
YANKWASHI,    
18 KADUNA 
(KAD)  
1946/67 KADUNA  NORTH WEST 
(NW)  
23  BIRNIN,-GWARI, CHIKUN, GIWA, 
IGABI, IKARA, JABA, JEMA’A, KACHIA, 
KADUNA NORTH, KADUNA SOUTH, 
KAGARKO, KAJURU, KAURA, KAURU, 
KUBAU, KUDAN, LERE, MAKARFI, 
SABON-GARI, SANGA, SOBA, ZANGON-
KATAF, ZARIA.  
19 KANO 
(KAN)  
1976 KANO  NORTH WEST 
(NW)  
44 AJINGI, ALBASU, BAGWAI, BEBEJI, 
BICHI, BUNKURE, DALA, DAMBATTA, 
DAWAKIN KUDU, DAWAKIN TOFA, 
DOGUWA, FAGGE, GABASAWA, 
GARKO, GARUM MALLAM, GAYA, 
GEZAWA, GWALE, GWARZO, KABO, 
KANO-MUNICIPAL, KARAYE, KIBIYA, 
KIRU, KUMBOTSO, KUNCHI, KURA, 
MADOBI, MAKODA, MINJIBIR, 
NASARAWA, RANO, RIMINGADO, 
ROGO, SHANONO, SUMAILA, TAKAI, 
TARAUNI, TOFA, TSANYAWA, TUDUN 
WADA, UNGOGO, WARAWA, WUDIL.  
20 KATSINA 1991 KASTINA  NORTH WEST 
(NW)  
34  BAKORI, BATAGARAWA, BATSARI, 
BAURE, BINDAWA, CHARANCHI, 
DANDUME, DANJA, DAN MUSA, 
DAURA, DUTSI, DUTSIN-MA, FASKARI, 
FUNTUA, INGAWA, JIBIA, KAFUR, 
KAITA KANKARA, KANKIA, KATSINA, 
KURFI, KUSADA, MAI’ AUDA, 
MALUMFASHI, MANI, MASHI, MATA, 
ZU, MUSAWA, RIMI, SABUWA, 
SAFANA, SANDAMU, ZANGO.  
21 KEBBI 
(KEB)  
1991 LOKOJA  NORTH WEST 
(NW)  
21 ALEIRO, AREWA-DANDI, ARGUNGU, 
AUGIE, BAGUDO, BIRNIN-KEBBI, 
BUNZA, DANDI, FAKAI, GWANDU, 
JEGA, KALGO, KOKO/BESSE, MAIYAMA, 
NGASKI, SAKABA, SHANGA, SURU, 
WASAGU/DANKO, YAURI, ZURU.  
22 KOGI 
(KOG)  
1991 LOKOJA  NORTH 
CENTRAL (NC)  
21 ADAVI, AJAOKUTA, ANKPA, BASSA, 
DEKINA, IBAJI, IDAH, IGALAMELA-
ODOLU, IJUMU, KABBA/BUNU, KOGI, 
LOKOJA, MOPA-MURA, OFU, 
OGORI/MAGONGO, OKEHI, OKENE, 
OLAMABOLO, OMALA, YAGBA EAST, 
YAGBA WEST.  
23 KWARA 
(KWA) 
1967 ILORIN  NORTH 
CENTRAL (NC)  
16 ASA, BARUTEN, EDU, EKITI, 
IFELODUN, ILORI EAST, ILORI SOUTH, 
ILORI WEST, IREPODUN, ISIN, 
KAIAMA, MORA, OFFA, OKE-ERO, 
OYUN, PATEGI.  
24 LAGOS 
(LAG) 
1976 LAGOS  SOUTH WEST 
(SW)  
20 AGEGE, AJEROMI IFELODUN, 
ALIMOSHO, AMUWO ODOFIN, APAPA, 
BADAGRY, EPE, ETI-OSA, IBEJU/LEKKI, 
IFAKO-IJAYE, IKEJA, IKORODU, 
KOSOFE, LAGOS ISLAND, LAGOS 
MAINLAND, MMUSHIN, OJO, OSHODI-
ISOLO, SHOMOLU, SURULERE.  
25 NASSARA
WA (NAS)  
1996 LAFIA  NORTH 
CENTRAL (NC)  
13 AKWANGA, AWE, DOMA, KARU, 
KEANA, KEFI, KOKONA, LAFIA, 
NASARAWA, NASARAWA-EGGON, OBI, 
TOTO, WAMBA.  
26 NIGER 
(NIG) 
1976  MINNA  NORTH 
CENTRAL (NC)  
25  AGAIE, AGWARA, BIDA, BORGU, 
BOSSO, CHANCHAGA, EDATI, GBAKO, 
GURARA, KATCHA, KONTAGORA, 
LAPAI, LAVUN, MAGAMA, MARIGA, 
MASHEGU, MOKWA, MUYA, PAIKORO, 
RAFI, RIJAU, SHIRORA, SULEJA, TAFA, 
WUSHISHI. 
27 OGUN 
(OGU)  
1976  IABEOKUTA  SOUTH WEST 
(SW)  
20  ABEOKUTA NORTH, ABEOKUTA 
SOUTH, ADO-ODO/OTA, EGBADO 
NORTH, EGBADO SOUTH, EWEKORO, 
IFO, IJEBU-EAST, IJEBU NORTH, IJEBU 
NORTH EAST, IJEBU ODE, IKENNE, 
IMEKO-AFON, IPOKIA, OBAFEMI-
OWODE, OGUN-WATERSIDE, ODEDA, 
ODOGBOLU, REMO NORTH, SHAGAMU.  
28 ONDU 
(OND)  
1987 AKURE  SOUTH WEST 
(SW)  
18  AKOKO NORTH EAST, AKOKO NORTH 
WEST, AKOKO SOUTH-EAST, AKOKO 
SOUTH WEST, AKURE NORTH, AKURE 
SOUTH, ESE-ODO, IDANRE, IFEDORE, 
LLE-OLUJI-OKEIGBO, IRELE, ODIGBO, 
OKITIPUPA, ONDO EAST, ONDO 
WEST, OSE, OWO.  
29 OSUN 
(OSU) 
1991 OSHOBO  SOUTH WEST 
(SW) 
30  AIYEDADE, AIYEDIRE, ATAKUMOSA 
EAST, ATAKUMOSA WEST, 
BOLUWADURA, BORIPE, EDE NORTH, 
EDE SOUTH, EGBEDORE, EJIGBO, IFE 
CENTRAL, IFE EAST, IFE NORTH, IFE 
SOUTH, IFEDAYO, IFELODUN, LLA, 
LLESHA EAST, LLESHA WEST, 
IREPODUN, IREWOLE, ISOKAN, IWO, 
OBOKUN, ODO-OTIN, OLA-OLUWA, 
OLORUNDA, ORIADE, OROLU, 
OSOGBO.  
30 OYO 
(OYO)  
1946 IBADAN  SOUTH WEST 
(SW)  
33 AFIJIO, AKINYELE, ATIBA, ATIGBO, 
EGBEDA, IBADAN CENTRAL, IBADAN 
NORTH, IBADAN NORTH WEST, 
IBADAN SOUTH EAST, IBADAN SOUTH 
WEST, IBARAPA CENTRAL, IBARAPA 
EAST, IBARAPA NORTH, IDO, IREPO, 
ISEYIN, ITESIWAJU, IWAJOWA, 
KAJOLA, LAGELU, OGBOMOSO NORTH, 
OBOMOSO SOUTH, OGO OLUWA, 
OLORUNSOGO, OLUYOLE, ONA-ARA, 
ORELOPE, ORI IRE, OYO EAST, OYO 
WEST, SAKI EAST, SAKI WEST, 
SURULERE.  
31 PLATEAU 1967  JOS  NORTH 17 BARIKIN LADI, BASSA, BOKKOS, JOS 
(PLA)  CENTRAL (NC)  EAST, JOS NORTH, JOS SOUTH, 
KANAM, KANKE, LANGTANG NORTH, 
LANGTANG SOUTH, MANGU, MIKANG, 
PANKSHIN, QUA’ AN PAN, RIYOM, 
SHENDAM, WASE.  
32 RIVERS 
(RIV) 
1967 PORTHARCOU
RT  
SOUTH SOUTH 
(SS)  
23 ABUA/ODUAL, AHOADA EAST, AHOADA 
WEST, AKUKU TORU, ANDONI, ASARI-
TORU, BONNY, DEGEMA, EMOHUA, 
ELEME, ETCHE, GOKANA, IKWERRE, 
KHANA, OBIAJ AKPOR, 
OGBA/EGBEMA/NDONI, OGU/BOLA, 
OKRIKA, OMUMMA, OPOBO/NKORA, 
OYIGBO, PORT-HARCOURT, TAI.  
33 SOKOTO 
(SOK)  
1976 SOKOTO  NORTH WEST 
(NW)  
23 BINJI, BODINGA, DANGE-SHUNI, 
GADA, GORANYO, GUDU, 
GWADABAWA, LLIELA, ISA, KWARE, 
KEBBE, RABAH, SABON BIRNI, 
SHAGARI, SILAME, SOKOTO NORTH, 
SOKOTO SOUTH, TAMBUWAL, 
TANGAZA, TURETA, WAMAKKO, 
WURNO, YABO.  
34 TARABA 
(TAR)  
1996 JALINGO  NORTH EAST 
(NC)  
16 ARDO-KOLA, BALI, DONGA, GASHAKA, 
GASSOL, IBI, JALINGO, KARIM-
LAMIDO, KURMI, LAU, SARDAUNA, 
TAKUM, USSA, WUKARI, YORRA, ZING.  
35 YOBE 
(YOB) 
1991 DAMATURU  NORTH EAST 
(NE)  
17 BADE, BURSARI, DAMATURU, FIKA, 
FUNE, GEIDAM, GUJBA, GULANI, 
JAKUSKO, KARASUWA, MACHINA, 
NANGERE, NGURU, POTISKUM, 
TARMUA, YUNUSARI, YUSAFARI.  
36 ZAMFARA 
(ZAM) 
1996 GASAU  NORTH WEST 
(NW) 
14 ANKA, BAKURA, BIRNIN MAGAJI, 
BUKKUYUM, BUNGUDU, GUMMI, 
GUSAU, KAURA NAMODA, MARADUN, 
MARU, SHINKAFI, TALATA, MAFARA, 
TSAFE, ZURMI. 
37 FEDERAL 
CAPITAL 
TERRIIOT
ORY (FCT)  
2ND 
REPUBLIC  
ABUJA  NORTHERN 
CENTRALIZED  
6 ABAJI, ABUJA MUNICIPAL, BWARI, 
GWAGWALADA, KUJE, KWALI.  
 
 
NB: 
(i) NE + NW + NC + N + SW + SS = 6 GEO-POLITICAL ZONES 
(REGIONS) OF NIGERIA 
 
(ii) NE(6) + NW(7) + NC(6) = 19 NORTHERN STATES OF NIGERIA  
 
 
(iii) SE(5) + SW(6) +SS(5) = 17 SOUTHERN STATES OF NIGERIA  
 
(iv) ABI(17) + ADA(21) + AKW(31) + ANA(21) + BAU(20) + BAY(32) + 
BEN(23) + BOR(27) + CRR(18) DEL(25) + EBO(13) + EDO(18) + 
EKI(16) + ENU(17) + GOM(10) + IMO(27) + JIG(27) + KAD(23) + 
KAN(44) + KAT(34) + KEB(21) + KOG(21) + KWA(16) + LAG(20) + 
NAS(13) + NIG(25) + OGU(20) + OND(18) + OSU(30) + OYO(33) + 
PLA(17) + RIV(23) + SOK(23) + TAR(16) + YOB(17) + ZAM(14) 
=774 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREAS OF NIGERIA.    
 
Indeed, the emergence of a democratic Nigeria (in May 1999) ended sixteen 
years of consecutive military rule. On the completion of his four years tenure 
in 2013, Obasanjo was re-elected as the new Nigeria president (until 2007) 
which serves as his second tenure.  
 Yet, in the presidential election held on 21 April 2007, Umaru Yar’adua 
was elected as elected as president. However, the election was highly 
controversial and strongly criticized by observers. In other words, the election 
was marred by electoral fraud and denounced by other candidates and 
international observers. Despites numerous petitions by opponents, Yar’Adua’s 
new cabinet were sworn in on 26 July, 2007. But as nature determines, Umaru 
Yar’ Adua left Nigeria on 23 November, 2009 for medical treatment. 
Consequently, on a February, 2010, the Nigeria Senate determined that 
presidential power should be transmitted to the Vice President. Thus, DR. 
Goodluck Jonathan was appointed to serve as Acting President (with all the 
accompanying powers) until when and if Yar’ Adua returned to full health. 
Regrettably, Yar’ Adua died on 5th May 2010 and Jonathan was sworn in as 
new President on 6th May, 2010.    As part of his mandate, Jonathan was to 
serve as President until the next General Election in 2011. As recorded, 
President Goodluck Jonathan polled over 22 million votes to beat 17 other 
contestants to win the presidential race held on April 16, 2011; and 
subsequently sworn in as the new president on May 29, 2011. Indeed, the 
failures, successes and challenges of Jonathan’s administration are still 
debatable. Yet, one may ask why is Nigeria unable to justify the cardinal 
elements of its motto (Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress) which speak 
volumes about the dreams of the country’s founding fathers? In fact, these 
four cardinal elements are essential building blocks for the construction of a 
viable country. Here, it was expected that a united country with a strong faith 
in its abilities would not have difficulty achieving peace and progress that will 
make it a force to reckon with in the comity of nations. Regrettably, after fifty 
– three years of independent existence, these dreams of country’s founding 
fathers have sadly remained tall dreams as the country (buffeted by cross-
current of opposing influences) appears dangerously away from the set goals.  
 Specifically, the results of the House of Representative public sessions 
on the amendment of the 1999 constitution is the equivalent of a civilian 
coup; as it appears to have produced a predetermined end. Indeed, the House 
first took a democratic ride by having public sessions in the 360 federal 
constituencies to examine the proposed amendments to the constitution and 
make their inputs. However, those who understand the tides and tempers of 
Nigeria politics predicted that the results would not really be the 
representatives of wishes of the people. Rather, it would be an opportunity for 
the North to reinforce the political advantage gained under successive military 
regimes by blocking amendments that may be considered as favorable the 
Southern Nigerian. As predicted, the results of the public sessions showed that 
the North refuse to shift grounds on almost all the major of interest to the 
South. Particularly, the South-East has been very eloquent about its structural 
marginalization since the end of Biafra civil war. Evidently this manifested in 
the South- East geo-political zone having the least number of states and local 
governments in the Nigeria Federation. Therefore, the general view has been 
that a state should be created for South- East so as to be at par with other 
regions. However, the results collated by the constitution review committee 
showed that the proposed state created was technically rejected (among other 
sensitive issues). Again, since the 1999 constitution did not provide for a 
referendum to affirm constitution amendment; it then implies that the issue of 
Northern domination of the South might remain unresolved for some times. 
Therefore, it is clear that Nigeria is neither unique nor sacrosanct as we are 
made to believe.  
 Yet, in addressing the futility of the 1914 Amalgamation as well as the 
content of the secret document with its existence span, Achebe (2012) termed 
it elapse able. Notably, the 1914 Amalgamation document described Nigeria 
as a figment and has conspicuously remained hidden from the inquisitive 
Nigerians. Clearly, a peep into the hidden document of 1914 Amalgamation 
shows startling revelations that make Nigeria’s existence beyond January 2014 
illegal. In other words, the Amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria 
(by the British through the instrumentality of Lord Lugard) was to be 
experimented for 100 years to ascertain its workability or otherwise. It also 
allows disinterested units to opt out after the agreed period. Going by the 
letters of the secret document, the implication is that Nigeria will no longer 
(legally) exist by 2014 and the country will be back to pre-1914 status of the 
two states of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria (both legally and 
technically). But the ruling elites (class) may choose to ignore this reality 
except there is strong agitation for its implication or revolution from the 
people. Consequently, the distinct people in the original Southern and 
Northern Nigeria will by 2014 be at liberty to assert their political autonomy 
when this happens. In other words, all indigenous people will become self-
governed as they were before the inception of British colonization.  
 In the preparation (actualization) of the above Amalgamation status, 
there are recent (new) development in the nation’s security and religious 
challenges. In fact, a strange factor in the worrisome insurgency problem 
being tackled by the government was introduced with the revelation linking 
the Hezbollah terrorist group of Lebanon with assault on Nigeria. This linkage 
was not just by accident. Obviously, just like the Boko haram terrorist 
organization Hezbollah (Lebanese terrorist group are neck-deep in the 
spate of insurgency in Nigeria (as at today). As revealed by international 
scholars on terrorism, Nigeria Hezbollah has been in the making for some 
time. It is allegedly called the ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF NIGERIA (IMN) 
which is a much more representative and active organization. Indeed, the IMN 
is most identified with its leader (SHEIKH OBRAHIM ZAKZABY) who began his 
political career as a Sunni fundamentalist student leader influenced by the 
workers of SAYYID QUTB (Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood radical ideologue) 
whose ideas provided the basis for AL-QAEDA’s ideology. Much later, he 
moved to shiaism and his movement grew rapidly because of IRAN support. 
In fact, Zakzaky’s opportunistic association with the Iranian regime was 
rewarded with substantial funds and training (both religious and military). His 
movement is indeed operating in Nigeria’s Northern states of Kano and 
Kaduna. Specifically, Zakzaky fights for the full implementation of the Sharia 
Law and also demands that Nigeria abandons secularism and become an 
Islamic State of Iran model. Presently IMN’s popularity is growing among the 
impoverished Nigeria Muslims and it is challenging the country Muslim leaders. 
Zakzaky has actually argued that the current wave of attacks in the name of 
Boko harm is a deliberate agenda to suppress is LAMIC RESURGENCE in 
Nigeria (with special focus on the Islamic Movement in Nigeria). Consequently, 
there is a global fear and apprehension of the superpowers on the current 
agitation for ISLAMIC REVIVAL in Nigeria; that the country will eventually 
become ISLAMIC, and in particular ‘SHIA ISLAM’. Indisputably, BOKOHARAM 
can therefore be classified as SUNNI JIHA DIST terrorist organization which 
has grave consequences for the continued existence of the Nigeria Unity.  
 Therefore, imagine for a moment Nigeria dissolving or collapsing into 
smaller countries like ‘’REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA’, OODUA NATION’, 
REPUBLIC OF ARAWA’ OR THE ‘IJAW NATION’. Is it then possible for 
the fifty two year- old country to fail and in the alternative fragment to pieces? 
Again, can Nigeria go the way of India (from which Pakistan was excised) or 
the Soviet Union that produced smaller countries like Russia, Ukraine or 
Uzbekistan? Can Nigeria also go like Sudan that has just had a breakaway 
Southern Sudan? Again, in the event that the country breaks up, will there be 
peace, harmony and progress in the new emerging entities? What exactly will 
be the gains or losses of a disintegrated Nigeria? Clearly, these are questions 
that demand urgent answers. Perhaps, amongst former British colonies, three 
nations (Nigeria, Sudan and India) were created contradictions that made 
them impossible to function by particularly lumping significant Muslim 
populations with other ethnic religious groups. Unfortunately, out of these 
countries, India and Sudan has disintegrated while Nigeria. She is a nation 
consumed by injustice, hatred and self destruction. Also, she is one of the 
most failed nations on earth that is incapable of providing the needed 
fundamental human right (which is the right to life) as well as basic essentials 
of life. Clearly, any careful observer will realize that the concept of one Nigeria 
has always been scan that remains unbelievable. It is only being a convenient 
way to look the nation’s treasury. In anticipation of the nation’s eventual 
collapse, most of the Nigerian leaders are busy building their future empire 
outside Nigeria. Indeed, one may be tempted to conclude that Nigeria 
is already a disintegrated nation. In other words, how can one explain a 
nation where ethnic groups are returning to their enclaves because of ethno-
religious crisis? Similarly, how can one explain a nation where a section of the 
country introduces Sharia laws in violation of the constitution? Again, how can 
one explain a nation where terrorists bomb and kill innocent people in 
churches and other locations (without any reason)?  
Consequently, Nigeria might be a might mare and we need to 
finally confront the reality of its impossibility (as a viable nation) and 
break it up. Perhaps, the following causes of disintegration in the world 
could be referenced as appropriate: 
(A) the Scottish scheduled independence referendum for September 2014 
after centuries of British union;  
(B) the soviet union (1991) nuclear world power disintegration;  
(C) the Pakistan (1947) secession from India by seeking a separate nation 
for Muslims;  
(D) the Eritrea (1993) secession from Sudan by using referendum;  
(E) the Yugoslavia (1992) disintegration into more than eight new nations;  
(F) the Czechoslovakia (1993) disintegration;  
(G) the Bangladesh (1971) secession from Pakistan;  
(H) the East Timor (2002) secession from Indonesia; and  
(I) the South Sudan (2011) secession from Sudan.  
Thus, there is a long precedent of self determination by many nations around 
the world and none of the new nations have ever regretted their decisions to 
separate from their former nations (in spite of any confronting challenges).  
Perhaps, the single greatest gain of Nigeria’s breakup may be the possibility to 
hold leaders accountable in a new nation freed from Nigeria’s contradictions.  
 
6.0 INSTITUTIONAL REFORM STRATEGIES  
 Indeed, leadership actions to restore confidence of strake holders and 
citizens in collective capacities for change are very crucial steps in moving 
away from the brink of violence. In other words, the trust that the population 
and stakeholders have in state institutions to deal with violence can become 
shaky when insecurity is rising (or in the aftermath of repeated bouts of 
conflict). Thus, there is great need to accept the importance of building 
inclusive-enough coalitions and identifying the signals and commitment 
mechanisms that can galvanize support for change. Again, national reformers 
have to deliver result on the ground to build confidence in citizen security, 
justice and economic prospects. That is, they are expected to consider 
coalitions (inclusive enough) and the signals, commitment mechanisms as well 
as early results that can help achieve momentum for later institutional 
transformations. Notable, building coalitions at the local level (where the state 
works with community leaders to combat violence) can be an important part 
of responses to criminal violence as well as political violence. Regrettably, 
violence shortens the time horizons of consumers, producers, traders and 
policy makers. Outreach to the private sector can therefore help build a sense 
of the long-term, which is critical for planning future investment and 
sustainable growth. The inclusion of civil society (informal and traditional 
institutions) in inclusive-enough coalitions helps in acquiring broader societal 
legitimacy and in ensuring that citizen security, justice and jobs reach all 
segments of society. Also, community, traditional and civil society structures 
can be crucial partners for the delivery of early results, where state reach and 
trust with violence –affected communities is low. In fact, by drawing on 
nonstate capacity, governments can stretch their ability to deliver public goods 
and signal an inclusive partnership between the state and other parts of 
society. Common to successful leadership (whether individual or collective) is 
the ability to redefine citizen and elite expectation; to move them then beyond 
negative frames of reference; and to transform public policies and 
institutions  in ways that will enable the state to address immediate and 
long-term sources of discord.  
 Given the link between corruption and violence; judicious, rapid 
transparency and anti-corruption measures can help restore stakeholder and 
citizen confidence. Yet, consolidating and coordinating security services is a 
fundamental first step in institutional reforms to prevent violence. Making 
security reform a top priority does not mean fully comprehensive reform and 
modernization across all aspects of these systems. Here, basic reforms that 
improves citizen security (that prevents outright capture of the system, can 
enable reforms to move forward in other political and economic areas, thereby 
allowing more gradual comprehensive reform and professionalization. Again, 
transparency of budget and expenditure information is an easy change to put 
in place early on and can be crucial to stem illegal flows of funds into violent 
activities. In fact, Social accountability approaches draw on the incentives 
for citizens and communities to monitor the expenditures most directly 
affecting their welfare. Basically, these tools include citizen report cards, 
community score cards, participatory public budgeting, and public expenditure 
tracking surveys as well as community-driven development approaches (where 
expenditures are publicized transparently at the local level). However, in 
fragile situations, such social accountability tools can contribute to building 
citizens’ trust in the state at the national and local levels. And yet, the 
essential building blocks of international support to successful international 
transformation are time and patience, best-fit approaches appropriate to the 
local political context; and supporting capacity for critical institutional reform 
in the areas of citizen, security justice (and jobs).  
 Empirically, countries go through multiple transitions over a period of at 
least a generation before achieving institutional resilience. Because trust is low 
in high-risk environments, building confidence and political support among 
stake holders in each round of change is a prelude to institutional 
transformation. Thus, managing these complex dynamics and multiple 
transitions is the basis of state craft; and there is no substitute for the 
judicious blend of political judgment, deep knowledge of actors, innovation, 
and tactical calculus that only national reformers can viewed. In general, when 
confronted with a rising crisis or transition opportunity, national reformers and 
their international partners have a variety of tools available for confidence-
building and the development of “inclusive-enough” coalitions (based on 
lessons from a range of country experiences). Table (6.1) highlights the core 
tools for restoring confidence (World Bank, 2011). Here, key stakeholder 
groups whose support has often been sought in coalition-building include the 
leaders and populations affected and targeted by violence, security actors, 
combatants, political leaders, business, civilian and international partners.  
 
TABLE 6.1 CONFIDENCE RESTORATION: THE CORE TOOLS 
A B C D 
SIGNALS: FUTURE 
POLICY AND PRIORMES 
SIGNALS: IMMEDIATE 
ACTIONS 
COMMITMENT 
MECHANISMS 
SUPPORTING ACTIONS 
1. CITIZEN SECURITY 
GOALS 
1. PARTICIPATORY 
PROCESSES 
1. KEY EXECUTING 
AGENCIES 
INDEPENDENCE 
1. RISK AND PRIORITY 
ASSESSMENTS 
2. KEY PRINCIPLES AND 
REALISTIC TIMELINES 
FOR ADDRESSING 
POLITICAL REFORM, 
DECENTRALIZATION 
LOCAL SECURITY, 
JUSTICE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT RESULTS 
2. THIRD PARTY 
INDEPENDENT 
MONITORING 
2. INACTION 
COMMUNICATION 
COSTS 
CORRUPTION, BASIC 
JUSTICE SERVICES, AND 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
3. UTILIZE STATE, 
COMMUNITY, NGO, AND 
INTERNATIONAL 
CAPACITIES 
3. CREDIBLE 
GOVERNMENT 
APPOINTMENTS 
3. DUAL KEY SYSTEMS 3. SIMPLE PLAN AND 
PROGRESS MEASURES 
BASED ON EARLY 
RESULTS 
 4. EXPENDITURES 
TRANSPARENCY 
3. INTERNATIONAL 
FUNCTIONS EXECUTION 
4. STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION 
 5. SECURITY FORCES 
REDEPLOYMENT 
  
 6. DISCRIMINATORY 
POLICIES REMOVAL 
  
       
 
Clearly, the particular mix of transition opportunities, stresses, stakeholders, and 
institutional challenges makes a difference in selecting types of confidence-building 
approaches. On one hand, where political power is contested and opposition groups 
have the potential to derail progress, developing collaborative capacities among 
political parties is crucial. On the other hand, where political leadership is 
uncontested, more focused approaches to building coalitions between the ruling 
party and key stakeholders whose support is needed can be inclusive enough to 
create momentum for change. But where the engagement of external partners can 
provide additional support or help manage external stresses, signals that build their 
confidence become more important.  
 Operationally, the way programs are designed must vary according to country 
circumstances, but experience suggests a core set of basic program tools/delivered 
at scale either nationally or sub nationally) that can be adapted to different country 
contexts from low to high income and with different mixes of criminal and political 
violence. Table (6.2) shows the various core tools for transforming institutions. 
Clearly, these are programs based on the concept of building a rhythm of repeated 
successes, linking regular early results for confidence-building with longer-term 
institutional transformation. In other words, confidence-building though 
collaborative approaches and early results and the foundational reform that can 
deliver citizen security, justice and jobs have some elements in common. But they 
need to be well adapted to the local political context. Therefore, the task of national 
reformers and international representatives in the field is made easier (or harder) by 
the supporting environments in global policy and in the headquarters of bilateral 
actors and the global institutions. For the international partners, there is need to 
more away from simply tweaking current practices toward a fundamentally new 
practical set of tools to link development and security, development and mediation 
as well as development and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, new tools should 
aim to have a catalytic effect in supporting (confidence-building and longer-term 
institutional transformation). 
 
TABLE 6.2 TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS: THE CORE TOOLS 
A 
CITIZEN SECURITY 
B 
JUSTICE 
C 
JOBS/ASSOCIATED 
SERVICES 
1. SECURITY SECTOR 
REFORM  
I) Designed to deliver citizen 
security benefits  
II) Capacity increases linked to 
repeated realistic performance 
outcomes and justice functions 
III) Dismantling of criminal 
networks through civilian 
oversight, vetting and budget 
1. JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM  
I) Independence and links to 
security reforms  
II) Strengthening of basic case 
load processing  
III) Extending of justice services, 
drawing on traditional/community 
mechanisms  
2. PHASING ANTI-
CORRUPTION MEASURES 
1. MULTISECTORAL 
COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT 
PROGRAMS: Combining citizen 
security, employment, justice, 
education and infrastructure  
2. EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS:  
I) Regulatory simplification and 
infrastructure recovery for private 
sector job creation  
II) Long-term public programs  
expenditure transparency  
IV) Use of low-capital systems for 
rural and community policing  
V) Phased capacity and 
accountability in specialized 
security functions  
I) Demonstration that national 
resources can be used for public 
good before dismantling rent 
systems 
II) Control of capture of rents  
III) Use of social accountability 
mechanisms  
IV) Political and electoral reform  
V) Decentralization  
VI) Transitional Justice  
VII) Comprehensive anti-
corruption Reforms     
III) Asset Expansion  
IV) Value chain programs  
V) Informal sector support  
VI) Labor migration  
VII) Women’s economic 
empowerment  
3. HUMANITARIAN DELIVERY 
AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: 
with planned transition from 
international provision  
4. MACRDECONOMIC POLICY: 
focus on  
I) Consumer price, volatility and 
employment  
II) Structural economic reforms 
such as privatization  
III) Education and health reforms  
IV) Inclusion of Marginalized 
groups  
          
 
 Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of human life, or on 
international legal rules, there are some universally accepted norm that are 
reflected in the charter of the United National and other international instruments. 
Notable, these norms are not self-implementing, and because they include the right 
to cultural diversity; their interpretation must reflect local, national and regional 
diversity. Thus, regional institutions can bridge the distance between universal 
norms and local customs. Yet, those customs or practices must conform (in 
substance) to the core international principles from which the international 
community derives its cohesion. Otherwise, cultural diversity can simply override as 
well as undermine the international framework. In their assistance to development, 
international actors must resist the exportation of form over substance and accept 
the regionalization of norms that enhance rather than impede their true universal 
character. In the same spirit, regional actors must translate in a culturally relevant 
way, international norms and repudiate-non conforming practices. However, all 
must concede that the standards set by universal norms are aspirations and 
measures of performance should reflect progress, stagnation or regression toward a 
common universal ideal. In this regard, African countries are expected to create 
intelligent fusion cell that would combine information from the military, spy services, 
police, federal and local agencies. This cell should coordinate counter-terrorism 
activities and serve as a contact for foreign intelligence services. However, it is 
evident that same problems are beyond the capacity of individual states to deal with 
effectively and therefore requires a global governance system. Thus, there are two 
elements of global governance that are critical to human development: democratic 
accountability and institutional experimentation. Here, democratic accountability 
requires that global institutions adequately represent the views of people and 
countries around the world and do not reinforce the deep inequalities in the 
distribution of economic and political power. It also requires broader representation 
of Africa countries in the governance of international financial institutions. On the 
other hand, institutional experimentation requires opening up policy and institutional 
spaces to allow people and societies to adjust, adapt and frame their own 
development strategies. Of course, solutions must be adapted to the institutions 
needing reform and the problems being addressed. Yet, the basic principles can be 
broadly applied: a global governance system that promotes democratic 
accountability, transparency and inclusion of the poor Africa countries; a stable and 
sustainable global economic climate as well as financial stability. In the final 
analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread; a 
job that was not cut; an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence as 
well as a dissident who was not silenced. Consequently, there is no tension between 
human development and sustainable development. Sincerely, both concepts are 
strongly rooted on the universalism of life claims as dignified by Almighty God.          
 
 
7.0 RESILENCE POLICY MEASURES 
Precisely, human development is the expansion of people’s freedoms to give 
long, healthy and creative lines; to advance other goals they have reason to 
engage activity in shaping development equitably and sustainable on a shared 
planet. Thus, people are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human 
development (as individuals and in groups). Notably, the policies and reforms 
compatible with progress vary widely across institutional settings and depend 
on structural and political constraints. Therefore, attempts to transplant 
institutional and policy solution across countries with different conditions often 
fail. Typically, policies must be informed by the prevailing institutional setting 
to bring about change. In other words, putting people at the center of 
development means progress that is equitable. That is, enabling people to be 
active participants in change and ensuring that current achievements are not 
attained at the expense of future generation. Hence, the emergence of new 
economics (an economics of human development) in which the objectives is to 
further human well-being and in which growth and other policies are 
evaluated and pursued vigorously to the extent that they advance human 
development in the short and long term. Indeed, people are the real 
wealth of a nation. Hence, the basic objective of sustainable development is 
to create an enabling environment for people to live long, healthy 
and creative righteous lives. This may appear to be a simple truth that is 
often forgotten in the immediate concern with materialism. 
 Individuals, groups and leaders who promote human development 
operate under strong institutional structural and political constraints that affect 
policy options. But experience suggests broad principles for shaping an 
appropriate agenda for human development. Here, strategies may yield good 
results in some contexts but not others; making flexibility a critical aspects of 
policy and institutional design. Hence, all policies and programmes require 
effective state capacity. Regrettably, many officials face hard trade-offs (every 
day) working in difficult, uncertain and under- resourced circumstances and 
bearing responsibility for controversial outcomes. Beyond skill and 
infrastructure, capacity also reflects less tangible factors. It is shaped by the 
levels and types of power and organizational ability of people and institutions. 
It also reflects how people accept or resist the status quo; how institutions 
support or constrain a desire for change as well as the spread of information 
open critical debate. Critically, this recognition takes us directly to a critique of 
two common approaches to policy design: the technocratic fix (which assumes 
a well functioning state and regulatory system) and the transplanted-
institution solution (which assumes that successful institutions in developed 
countries can be transplanted to developing countries). In both cases, 
institutions are likely to be distorted by prevailing social and political forces; 
and neither approach is likely to succeed. Unfortunately, the history of 
development projects that have pursued these routes shows a high likelihood 
of failures. 
 In fact, there are many ways to conduct institutional functions and no 
single intervention is likely to have the power and traction to shift a complex 
system. Again, there are limits to how quickly capacity can be developed and 
increased; and attempting to drive changes faster than the underlying 
consensus will support can provide social and political resistance. Particularly, 
this so when trying to redress power imbalances in favor of marginalized 
individuals (groups). Thus, organizations and institutions trend to evolve at 
different speeds through phases and in patterns that shape their capacity. And 
this way conflict with donor timelines and the need to show results. Clearly, a 
better understanding of local specificities and local power structures and of 
local specificities and local power structures and of appropriate designs and 
time lines can help avoids such missteps. Evidently, there is no single policy 
mechanism that can be presented as the way to stop or prevent conflict. 
Nonetheless, the scope for polices that can help lessen the policy makers need 
to address the underlying causes systematically (especially horizontal 
inequalities in political, economic and social dimensions). Yet, effective 
prevention strategies require simultaneous action on political and economic 
fronts. Other words, any attempt to introduce political change without 
addressing deep-seated economic inequalities in the society are doomed to 
failure. 
 Therefore, the general direction of policy change must be reducing 
group inequalities. Essentially, this requires inclusive government (politically, 
economically and socially). Here, politically inclusive government means that 
all major groups in a society participate in political power, administration, 
army and police. Economically inclusive government implies that horizontal 
inequality in economic aspects (assets, employment and incomes) is 
moderate. Certainly, these conditions would limit the private incentives to 
leaders and followers to engage in conflict. However, further specific 
programmes may be required in this respect. Thus, the general objective of 
inclusivity and moderate horizontal inequality will translate (differently) into 
specific policy recommendations in different country circumstances (as 
appropriate and justifiable). Yet, actions to specifically address external 
stresses can be taken in security, justice and development areas. Table (7.1) 
shows the adaptable core tools for national action to address external stresses 
confronting African economies (World Bank, 2011). In fact, some of the 
actions to address potential external stresses and opportunities fall in the 
purely diplomatic and security sphere. Here, border cooperation, 
redeployment of troops to signal non-interference or engagement in shared 
security approaches (or simple diplomatic signals) can all form an important 
part of the basic tools for restoration of confidence. 
 
TABLE 7.1  NATIONAL POLICIES AND EXTERNAL STRESSES: ENABLING TOOLS 
CITIZEN SECURITY  JUSTICE JOBS (ASSOCIATED 
SERVICES) 
1. BORDER COOPERATION  
2. MILITARY, POLICE AND 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE  
1. COORDINATION OF SUPPLY 
AND DEMAND SIDE RESPONES  
2. JOINT INVESTIGATIONS AND 
PROSECUTIONS ACROSS 
JURISDICTIONS  
3. BUILDING OF LINKS BETWEEN 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL SYSTEM  
1. POOLED SUPPLEMENTARY 
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY  
2. CROSS BORDER 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING  
3. SOCIAL PROTECTION TO 
MITIGATE GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
STRESSES.  
 
Again, cross-border programs to link security and development approaches can be 
initiated by national governments. In other words, openness to discussing both 
security and development cooperation across insecure border regions based on 
shared goals of citizen security, justice, and jobs has the potential to deliver results.   
 
 
 
8.0 CONCLUSION 
 Obviously, there have been a number of episodes of state- sponsored violence 
undertaken with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power. Since 
the government has access to an organized force (police/ army) and to finance, 
state terrorism can be an important source of humanitarian emergencies and 
degradation. Again, deliberate state policies were a critical internal political source 
of vulnerability during the past decades. This is in addition to factionalism coupled 
with intolerance of political opposition and state sanctioned terrorism (including 
purges) in response to dissent. In other words, elite factionalism was sustained by a 
high level of corruption to maintain allegiances, while lack of fiscal capacity on the 
part of the government increased the significant of local patronage systems. Indeed, 
the disintegration of the state is usually a long- term degenerative process; which 
may be brought about or enhanced by economic decline (as in several African 
countries such as Nigeria). Such situations are also often characterized by predatory 
rule or rent seeking. In particular and regrettably, the regimes in Nigeria operated 
on the bases of coercion, material inducement and personality politics (a 
combination that tends to degrade the institution of the state further). This 
adversely affected the efficiency of traditional state activities in the provision of 
basic infrastructure and creation of enabling environment for sustainable 
development. 
 However, the weak long term association between income growth and change 
in human welfare requires vigorous exploitation. Critically, economists and social 
scientists need to better understand the dynamics and interconnections. Critically, 
such studies would complement the extensive literature on economic growth and 
create a richer awareness of human development advances. Analytically, the 
economics of growth and its relationship with the study of development requires 
radial rethinking. Traditionally, a rust theoretical and empirical literature almost 
uniformly equates economic growth with economic development. Unfortunately, this 
bias is extended to growth econometrics, where estimates of the growth effects of 
policies are the basis of policy recommendations. Here, the assumption (often 
explicit) is that maximizing growth should be the policy maker’s objective. In 
contrast, the central contention of the human development approach is the well 
being is about much more than money. Precisely, because we care about so many 
different aspects of life, therefore we need an economics of development that 
explicitly recognizes its multi dimensionality. Again, measuring sustainability requires 
considerably more work, since many current measures differ (radically) in their 
conceptual basis and conclusions. However, addressing sustainability increases 
tensions between intragenerational and intergenerational equity, because not 
every policy will benefit poor people today as well as future generations. The time 
to act (equitably and sustainably) is now. Indeed, it is a shared and collective 
responsibility of the 21st century. 
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